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I. THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE 
Placing important decisions in the hands of the civil jury - made 
up of ordinary citizens untrained in the law - has long been criticized. 
For example, Erwin Griswold, law school dean and Solicitor General 
of the United States, asked, "Why should anyone think that 12 persons 
brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for their lack of 
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general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding contro­
versies between persons?"1 And Jerome Frank, law professor, aggres­
sive legal realist, and judge, argued that juries are uncertain, capri­
cious, and unpredictable, ignorant and prejudiced, poor factfinders, 
gullible, and incapable of following complex legal rules,2 thus making 
"the orderly administration of justice virtually impossible."3 The great 
weakness of even the most thoughtful of these criticisms is that they 
are based on little more than anecdote4 and assertion, rather than any­
thing resembling systematic empirical evidence. 
The first major study of jury decisionmaking was designed with the 
awareness that any assessment of the jury ultimately had to be made 
in comparison with judges, the decisionmakers who would replace the 
jury in any cases juries would not be permitted to decide.5 Accord­
ingly, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel asked judges in 8,000 civil and 
criminal cases sampled from around the United States how they would 
have decided each case if it were a bench trial instead of a jury trial. 6 
By comparing these responses to the actual jury verdicts, Kalven and 
Zeise! found that judges and juries agreed on the verdict in personal 
injury cases 79% of the time.7 They also found that when jurors and 
judges disagreed, the jury was no more inclined than the judge to favor 
plaintiffs over defendants,8 that the agreement-disagreement ratios 
remained the same for both easy and difficult cases (suggesting no lack 
1. 1962-1963 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL DEAN'S REPORT 5-6, quoted in HARRY 
KAI.VEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 5 (1966). 
2 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 183-99 (6th ed., Anchor Books 
1963). 
3. Id. at 195; see also JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 111-25 (1949). 
4. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort 
Litigation System -And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1161 (1992) ("The trouble 
with legislation by anecdote is not just that some of them are false or misleading. Even if 
true and accurate, anecdotes contribute little to developing a meaningful picture of the situa­
tion about which we are concerned . . .. The proportion of cases that results in one or the 
other error, and the ratio of one kind of error to the other, ought to be of greater interest to 
serious policy-makers than a handful of anecdotes on either side of the issue."); Marc 
Galanter et al., How to Improve Civil Justice Policy, 77 JUDICATURE 185, 185 (1994) ("Im­
proving the civil justice system requires thoughtful, objective analysis based on sound em­
pirical data. The lack of systematic, cumulative data in this area makes it possible for far­
reaching policy proposals to be advanced on the basis of tendentious anecdotes and num­
bers. A bias in which solutions to perceived problems are developed by reference to unusual 
and atypical cases goes unchallenged. Not surprisingly, the effects of the resulting policies 
are often unanticipated."), quoted in Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Pro­
file of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233, 234 (1996). 
5. See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 
1055-56, 1056 n.3 (1964). 
6. See id. at 1063. 
7. See id. at 1065. 
8. See id. 
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of comprehension by the juries),9 and that the judges rarely thought 
the juries' verdicts were unreasonable in light of the available evi­
dence and applicable law.10 In fact, the only noteworthy difference 
was that when juries did find liability, they awarded on average 20% 
more than judges said they would have awarded.11 Even that, how­
ever, was a more modest difference than critics of the jury would have 
had us believe. Perhaps because Kalven and Zeisel's research findings 
provided so little support to the usual criticisms, the critics fell silent 
for a generation. 
But by the mid-1980s, criticism of the civil jury returned with vigor, 
part of a more wide-ranging attack on the civil justice system (in par­
ticular, the tort system).12 "One of the most criticized aspects of jury 
behavior" has been juries' awards of general damages, also known as 
noneconomic damages or by the synecdoche "pain and suffering" 
awards.13 Unlike special or "economic" damages, the jury receives lit­
tle guidance regarding what a correct general damages award might 
be. And, unlike punitive damages, which are similarly lacking in guid­
ance but which are rarely awarded in accident cases, general damages 
are proper in every personal injury case in which awards are made. 
9. See id. at 1066. 
10. See id. at 1067. 
11. See id. at 1065. 
12. In general these attacks were no more grounded in empirical research than earlier 
assaults. Where data were mentioned, their interpretation often was rather careless. For 
extensive discussions and evaluations of that body of "evidence," see STEPHEN DANIELS & 
JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES ANO THE POLmCS OF REFORM (1995); Marc Galanter, Jury 
Shadows: Reflections on the Civil Jury and the "Litigation Explosion," in THE AMERICAN 
CIVILJURY: FINAL REPORT OF THE 1986 CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON 
.ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1987); Robert E. Li tan, Introduction, in VERDICT: 
AsSESSING THE CIVILJURY SYSTEM (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Robert J. MacCoun, Inside 
the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in 
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Peter H. 
Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY 
SYSTEM 306 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE 
AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP 
POCKETS ANO OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995); Stephen Daniels, The Question of 
Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda 
Building, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 269, 292-308; Marc Galanter, The 
Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Marc Galanter, News from 
Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENY. U. L. REV. 77 (1993); Marc 
Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996); Saks, 
supra note 4; and Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical 
Perspective, 40 Aruz. L. REV. 849 (1998). 
13. Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us About 
Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205, 1224 (1994); see also Oscar 
G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 
768-69 (1995) (asserting unexplainable variation among awards of pain and suffering in 
wrongful death cases); Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for 
Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VANO. L. REV. 1365, 1369-70 (1989) (asserting 
unjustified variation in awards for comparable injuries caused by medical malpractice and 
other tortious acts). 
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Moreover, general damages constitute about fifty-five to sixty percent 
of personal injury damages awards.14 It is no surprise, then, that gen­
eral damages have been at the center of contemporary debates on ju­
ries and the civil justice system. 
The critics of the civil jury assert that awards generally are unreli­
able, capricious, and "out of control."15 More specifically, general 
damages are alleged to be both excessive and influenced by inappro­
priate considerations, such as sympathy for the victims and the defen­
dant's apparent ability to pay.16 By implication then, jury decisions 
about general damages are thought to be insufficiently responsive to 
proper considerations, namely, the nature of the injury and its impact 
on the plaintiff's life. Moreover, implicit in these allegations is a 
problem that Jerome Frank had made explicit: that jurors do not 
think about cases the same way judges and lawyers do. 
Although research has begun to focus on damages, these studies 
have thus far left the basic issues underlying the criticisms of jury 
awards largely unanswered.17 These basic issues are how jurors per­
ceive injuries and translate those perceptions into dollar awards, and 
whether jurors' decisionmaking processes differ fundamentally from 
those of judges (and lawyers).18 The research reported in this Article 
investigates jurors' perceptions of injury seriousness and awards of 
general damages, and, like Kalven and Zeisel, compares them to 
judges' and lawyers' responses to the same injuries. The results of this 
most basic comparison have significant implications for criticisms of 
jury awards and for legal policy concerning jury trials.19 
14. See Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Ad­
justments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265, 296 (1998). 
15. See criticisms reviewed in works at supra note 12. 
16. Documentation of the various allegations can be found in the works cited supra note 
12. 
17. Much of the empirical research literature on compensatory damages is discussed in 
our review of the relevant literature, infra, Section II.B. 
18. Despite the well known research strategy of Kalven & Zeisel, only a few studies 
have directly compared the performance of jurors to judges. See Edmund S. Howe & 
Thomas C. Loftus, Integration of Intention and Outcome Information by Students and Circuit 
Court Judges: Design Economy and Individual Differences, 22 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 
102 (1992); Stephen Landsman & Richard Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of 
Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHA v. SCI. & L. 
113 (1994); Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability 
Enough?, 62 J. PERS. Soc. PSYCHOL. 739 (1992). None of these addressed, however, the 
question of damages. Another study contains a partial comparison (6 judges in a group 
composed mostly of lawyers). See Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Non­
economic Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Pro­
fessionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883 (1993). All of these studies found no differences in deci­
sionmaking between judges and jurors. 
19. A more detailed explication of the research questions is presented infra Section 
ill.A, and a more detailed discussion of the policy inlplications of the findings appears infra 
Section V.D. 
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To provide the context for our research, Part II of this Article 
briefly summarizes relevant aspects of the law and the empirical re­
search literature. The law governing general damages offers no real 
guidance to jurors or anyone else called upon to award damages at 
trial. Empirical research shows that jurors display a substantial 
amount of sensitivity to the relative seriousness of injuries (vertical 
equity) in awarding general damages, but also a considerable amount 
of variation within levels of severity (horizontal inequity). This body 
of research, however, has some conceptual and methodological weak­
nesses; thus, important empirical questions remain. 
Part III describes the research methods and design of our study. In 
brief, we sampled hundreds of jurors, judges, plaintiffs' lawyers, and 
defense lawyers from urban and rural regions of two different states. 
Through telephone interviews, we presented dozens of different inju­
ries (two per interviewee) to the respondents and had them evaluate 
the seriousness of the injuries and specify what general damages 
award seemed appropriate for the injury suffered. 
We used the survey responses to develop predictive (and arguably, 
explanatory) models of the decisionmaking of each group. We then 
used these statistical models to determine for each group which attrib­
utes of the injuries had what degree of impact on severity judgments 
and on awards, as well as how differences in the decisionmakers' geog­
raphy, demography, and experiences affected their decisions. Part IV 
presents the results of these analyses. In short, the models evidence a 
remarkable degree of similarity among all groups of decisionmakers, 
plus a high degree of predictability, in regard to their judgments of 
injury severity. As to the translation of injury perceptions into mone­
tary awards, however, more differences among the groups appeared, 
and the predictive power of the models declined. 
Part V presents our conclusions with respect to both the empirical 
findings and their policy implications. Taken together, the findings 
suggest that the differences between jurors' awards and those of the 
other groups do not reflect fundamental differences in decisionmak­
ing, but rather a loss of consistency in translating perceptions of se­
verity into damages awards. That loss of consistency likely can be at­
tributed to the fact that in assessing the value of a single case, jurors 
lack the frame of reference created by other cases that is readily avail­
able to judges and lawyers. If that diagnosis is correct, it suggests that 
some rather modest changes in procedure are likely to be sufficient to 
enable jurors' general damages awards to closely approximate those of 
judges in stability and predictability. 
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II. GENERALDAMAGES: THE LAW AND THE 
EMPIRICAL REsEARCH 
A. The Law of General Damages 
757 
In tort cases, general damages are awarded to compensate plain­
tiffs for physical pain, mental suffering, disability, disfigurement, loss 
of enjoyment of life, and other similar harms.20 While these "none­
conomic" damages may not be inherently different from "economic" 
damages such as lost earnings and medical expenses, markets exist to 
supply the values of the latter but not the former.21 If art can acquire a 
market value, in principle, so can the loss of sight. The problem is that 
people do not normally buy and sell the sorts of sensory, motor, cogni­
tive, and other capacities that are injured in accidents. The result is 
that to compensate for noneconomic losses, the law must tum to an 
alternative source of values, namely, the social judgment of the com­
munity, typically supplied by juries. A task that involves assigning a · 
value to the virtually undefinable is, by definition, challenging to per­
form and at least as challenging to evaluate. "One of the most difficult 
decisions facing the jury in a personal injury case is the size of the 
monetary award for pain and suffering, since there is no objective 
method of evaluating such damages."22 
The law itself provides essentially no guidance to jurors in reaching 
a "correct" general damages award. For instance, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts notes that "[t]he discretion of the judge or jury de­
termines the amount of recovery, the only standard being such an 
amount as a reasonable person would estimate as fair compensa­
tion. "23 In addition, the law requires that damages be particularized to 
both the details of the objective injury and its subjective effect on the 
20. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1979); 22 AM. JUR. 2D 
Damages § 28 (1988). 
21. See Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the System Survive?, 83 
NW. U. L. REV. 876, 896-900 (1989); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability 
Cases: Systematic Compensation or: Capricious Awards?, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203 
(1988). 
22. AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 260 (1988); see also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury 
and Negligence: The View from the Trenches, 28 GA. L. REV. 1, 97-98 (1993) (summarizing a 
survey of Georgia plaintiffs' and defense lawyers which found that they thought the most 
troublesome issue for the jury is a lack of guidance on how to assess damages, especially for 
pain and suffering); Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury 
Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE LJ. 217 (1993). 
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. b (1979). 
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individual victim.24 By implication, then, the law expects awards to re­
flect considerable variability.25 
Of course, the law has as little guidance to offer judges and lawyers 
in this pursuit as it does to juries. Nonetheless, critics of juries seem to 
believe that judges and lawyers somehow acquire judgmental capabili­
ties that juries lack, producing judgments which are somehow more 
"accurate," or at least more consistent, than those provided by jurors. 
B. Empirical Research on Damages Awards 
Researchers have sought to identify the determinants of damages 
awards. In archival studies, researchers have found that from half to 
almost three-fourths of the variation in awards actually made by juries 
(and sometimes by judges) can be accounted for by various measures 
of injury severity, such as medical expenses or ratings of severity and 
duration, as well as by other predictors.26 The measures of injury type, 
severity, and permanence are consistently the strongest predictors of 
awards, with injuries of greater severity and duration tending to re­
ceive more compensation than less severe and more temporary inju­
ries. Similarly, simulation studies, which examine mock jurors' awards 
in response to experimentally manipulated cases, also find the size of 
the award to correspond to the severity of the injury.27 
Despite these substantial predictive relationships, the findings sug­
gest there are both random and systematic errors in awards. The same 
24. See generally David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering 
Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 265 (1989). 
25. Nevertheless, many trial participants and commentators wish for less variability and 
more predictability than the law thus far has been able to design. 
26. See AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: 
WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRlALs (1985); MARK A. PETERSON, COMPENSATION 
FOR INJURIES: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY (1984); David Baldus et al., Im· 
proving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damage Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative 
Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 
IOWA L. REV. 1109 (1995); Randall Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and 
Other Injuries Created Equal?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 5 (hereinafter 
Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice]; Randall R Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in 
Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908 (1989) [hereinafter Bovbjerg 
et al., Valuing Life and Limb]; Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical 
Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 997 (1990); Vis­
cusi, supra note 21. 
27. See Jane Goodman et al., Runaway Verdicts or Reasoned Determinations: Mock J11-
ror Strategies in Awarding Damages, 29 JURIMETRICS 285, 289 (1989); Valerie Hans & M. 
David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 151 (1989); Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 
LA w & HUM. BEHA v. 243 (1997); Vidmar & Rice, supra note 18; Roselle L. Wissler et al., 
Explaining "Pain and Suffering" Awards: the Role of Injury Characteristics and Fault Attri­
butions, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 181 (1997). But see Corinne Cather et al., Plaintiff Inj11ry 
and Defendant Reprehensibility: Implications for Compensatory and Punitive Damage 
Awards, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189 (1996) (finding no difference in awards as a function 
of injury severity). 
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studies that find high correlations between injury severity and awards 
(termed "vertical equity") also report considerable variation in the 
amounts awarded for injuries at the same level of severity (referred to 
as "horizontal inequity"),28 which suggests the presence of a good deal 
of random error.29 
Systematic error in awards is seen in a number of studies which 
have found that, despite general vertical equity, plaintiffs with small 
losses tend to be overcompensated and those with large losses tend to 
be undercompensated.30 Moreover, several factors which should not 
have an effect on general damages awards, such as type of defendant 
(e.g., individual versus corporation) or type of case (e.g., auto crash 
versus medical malpractice )31 nevertheless seem to systematically in­
fluence the size of awards.32 In addition, some evidence suggests that 
where jurors reside influences their awards - that jurors in urban ar­
eas generally make larger awards than those in rural areas,33 and that 
28. See CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 26; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 26; Viscusi, supra 
note 21. 
29. In simulation studies, for instance, mock jurors are presented with identical case 
facts, yet the jurors produce an array of different awards, not one single award. See sources 
cited supra note 27. Of course, a complete absence of variability among a group of deci­
sionmakers seldom occurs. For a glimpse of the variability of other decisionmakers, see in­
fra Table 5. Accordingly, commentators who lament "horizontal inequity" cannot be sug­
gesting that its existence demonstrates a defect in the system of damages. What they really 
ought to be arguing is that the amount of horizontal variability is greater than they believe it 
should be. 
30. See ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: 
STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION at 248-52 (1964); ELIZABETH M. 
KING & JAMES P. SMITH, ECONOMIC LOSS AND COMPENSATION IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS 
at 74-76 (1988). 
31. See CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 26; PETERSON, supra note 26; Baldus et al., supra 
note 26; Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice, supra note 26; Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and 
Limb, supra note 26; James K. Hammitt et al., Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 751 (1985); Viscusi, supra note 21; David C. Baldus et al., Children's Models 
for Compensatory Damages (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors). 
32. Simulation studies, however, have added important qualifications and refinements 
to conclusions about the way in which these factors affect awards. Most importantly, they 
have found that differences in compensatory awards previously attributed to a "deep 
pocket" effect are not the result of differences in the defendants' wealth. See Robert J. 
MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the 
"Deep-Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 LAW & SOC'YREV. 121 (1996); Neil Vidmar, et al, Damage 
Awards and Jurors' Responsibility Ascriptions in Medical Versus Automobile Negligence 
Cases, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 149 (1994); Vidmar, supra note 22; William D. Woody et al., 
Compensating Plaintiffs and Punishing Defendants: Is Bifurcation Necessary? (1998) (un­
published manuscript, on file with the authors) (presented at the biennial meeting of the 
American Psychology-Law Society, Redondo Beach, Cal., 1998). Instead, the differences in 
awards are due to differences in perceptions of the defendants' intentionality, responsibility, 
recklessness, or competence to avoid the injury. See Valerie P. Hans, The Jury's Response to 
Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 177; 
Hans & Ermann, supra note 27; see also Goodman, et al., supra note 27; MacCoun, supra 
note 12; Vidmar et al., supra note 14. 
33. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND 
PUBLICPOLICY74-75 (1985). 
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jurors in some states characteristically make smaller or larger awards 
than those in other states.34 Thus, awards may depend on more than 
the characteristics of injuries and their sequelae. 
For answering questions of how jurors respond to the attributes of 
the injuries in making their general damages awards, the archival 
studies are insufficient in one or more ways. Typically, most jury 
awards are reported as single aggregate awards, instead of being sepa­
rated into their component parts. Thus, researchers generally use the 
total, undifferentiated award, not the specific general damages com­
ponent.35 And efforts by some researchers to disaggregate the awards 
after the fact36 tend to produce erroneous estimates of the general 
component.37 
Additionally, the degree of horizontal inequity suggested by many 
of the studies may reflect the limitations of the measurements used as 
much as any random error in jurors' decisions. For example, the se­
verity of injuries usually has been measured by grading a vast array of 
injuries on a scale of no more than eight or nine points.38 Each point 
on such a scale necessarily captures a range of injuries having different 
degrees of severity.39 That jurors would rate the injuries more finely, 
and award different amounts to injuries that researchers have treated 
as identical, is hardly a failing of juror decisionmaking. 
Further, these scales are unidimensional measures, though injuries, 
like most social objects and events, occupy a multidimensional space. 
For example, on the National Association of Insurance Commission­
ers' ("NAIC") Severity of Injury Scale, bums, surgical material left in 
a patient, drug side effects, and brain damage all are scored as Level 4 
injuries. The Procrustean compression by researchers into a single 
dimension of what the decisionmakers almost certainly saw as a multi­
dimensional injury squanders explanatory potential.40 Evidence of this 
34. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 12. 
35. See CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 26; PETERSON, supra note 26; Bovbjerg et al., 
Juries and Justice, supra note 26; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 26. 
36. See Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb, supra note 26; Viscusi, supra note 21. 
37. See Neil Vidmar, Making Inferences About Jury Behavior from Jury Verdict Statis­
tics: Cautions About the Lorelei's Lied, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 599 (1994); Vidmar et al., 
supra note 14. 
38. Some researchers use the Severity of Injury Scale developed by the National Asso­
ciation of Insurance Commissioners, see NAIC MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: FINAL 
COMPILATION {1980), which ranges from one (emotional injury only) to nine {death). See 
DANZON, supra note 33; Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice, supra note 26. 
39. See Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, in 
REFORMING THE C!vIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 339, 354 {Larry Kramer ed., 1996); Gary T. 
Schwartz, Proposals for Reforming Pain and Suffering Awards, in REFORMING THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 416, 419 {Larry Kramer ed., 1996) 
40. See Allen J. Hart et al., Multidimensional Perceptions of Illness and Injury, 2 
CURRENT REs. Soc. PSYCHOL. 30 (Sept. 11, 1997) <http://www.uiowa.edu/-grpproc/crisp/ 
crisp.html>; Andrew J. Slain et al., Multidimensional Perceptions of Injury: Implications for 
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problem is provided by data from simulation jurors, whose assess­
ments of injuries on four dimensions (disability, mental suffering, dis­
figurement, pain) better predicted their general damages awards (ac­
counting for 74 % of the variance) than did a single predictor based on 
the same jurors' assessments of the overall severity of injury (61 % of 
the variance in awards), which in turn was a better predictor than the 
NAIC scale (44%).41 
In addition to poor measurement of injuries, the studies finding 
substantial horizontal inequity also fail to take into account legally 
relevant differences among injury victims.42 For example, the exact 
same permanent loss of hearing should produce a larger general dam­
ages award for a musician than for a novelist. Moreover, a permanent 
injury should result in a larger award to compensate a 20-year-old 
plaintiff for 60 years of future pain and suffering than to compensate a 
60-year-old plaintiff for 20 years.43 All of these are examples of verti­
cal equity mistaken for horizontal inequity. 
Of course, to demonstrate that horizontal inequity has been over­
estimated in the literature is not to say that real sources of horizontal 
inequity, both random and systematic, do not exist. But we should not 
mistake one problem for another. And we certainly should not mis­
take. the limitations of the studies for the limitations of juror decision­
making. 
In all of these studies, it is impossible to know how well or poorly 
the jurors have done because there are almost no data for answering 
the inescapable question of "compared to what?" As Kalven and 
Zeise! noted long ago, in the study of juries, the usual answer to that 
question is: compared to the decision a judge would make in the same 
case, because judges are the most likely alternative to jurors.44 More 
recently, the answer might include alternative dispute resolution fo­
rums in which the decisionmakers might be lawyers (in the role of ar­
bitrators) or other professionals (as members of compensation 
boards). Studies using a straightforward comparison of damages 
awarded by judges and by juries suffer from case selection confounds 
because, owing to the strategic choices of lawyers, different mixes of 
cases go to juries than go to judges.45 Two recent studies overcame 
the "Adversary Culture" (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) (pre­
sented at the Biennial Meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Redondo Beach, 
Cal., 1998). 
41. See Wissler et al., supra note 27, at 195-202 (Experiment 2). 
42. Jurors evaluating general damages may and should take into account such things as 
pre-injury health, post-injury recovery, lifestyle, occupation, and social circumstances. See 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. i (1979). 
43. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1979). 
44. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). 
45. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcend­
ing Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124 (1992). 
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this problem by presenting the same case facts to arbitrators46 and to 
senior lawyers,47 as well as to jurors. Both studies found no significant 
differences in the general damages awards given by the different types 
of decisionmakers.48 
Significantly, prior studies tell researchers and reformers little 
about how jurors decide awards. As Goodman notes, "[l]ittle is 
known about the strategies or cognitive processes used by jurors in de­
termining damages."49 Such research is needed because "although 
critics tend to focus on the outcomes of jury decisionmaking - liability 
verdicts and damages awards - effective evaluation and implementa­
tion of policy also require an understanding of the process of jury deci­
sionmaking. "50 
Thus, fundamental questions about jurors' decisionmaking about 
general damages remain unanswered. What is the content and organi­
zation of people's perceptions of injuries? Given that most people 
have little systematic experience evaluating injuries, but generally re­
spond with intuitive, "gut" reactions, we might expect considerable 
random variation across individuals. How much random variation is 
there? By contrast, are systematic variations to be found between so­
cial groups? Are major differences to be found in perceptions of inju­
ries or in the special challenge of translating those perceptions into 
dollar awards?51 Does this translation step reveal its own systematic 
differences among groups? Most importantly, do judges and lawyers 
see or value injuries differently, or show less variability, than the ordi­
nary citizens who serve on juries? 
Ill. THE PRESENT REsEARCH 
A Overview 
The present study asks how the core attributes of injuries affect 
decisionmakers' perceptions of the injuries, how those perceptions are 
translated into dollar awards, and whether (and if so, how) these pat­
terns of response differ among jurors, judges, and lawyers. This re-
46. See Vidmar & Rice, supra note 18. 
47. See Vidmar, supra note 12, at 229-234. 
48. See Vidmar & Rice, supra note 18. 
49. See Goodman et al., supra note 27; see also Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex, and 
Death: Gender Bias in Wrongful Death Damage Awards, 25 L. & SOC'Y REV. 263, 264 
(1991) ("Little is known about factors that influence jury damage awards in civil cases."). 
50. MacCoun, supra note 12, at 137 (emphasis in original). 
51. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition 
and Valuation in Law), 101 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998); Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage 
and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINrY 49 
(1998) (a somewhat more technical presentation of the same study as Sunstein et al.); 
Wissler et al., supra note 27. 
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search took the form of a fractional factorial survey,52 in which numer­
ous and diverse injury scenarios were presented to judges, lawyers, 
and jurors. The respondents were asked to evaluate the injuries on 
several dimensions, to indicate their judgment of the injury's overall 
severity, and to provide an appropriate award. Respondents were se­
lected from two different states, which were chosen on the basis of 
previous research suggesting that the damages awards in one were 
characteristically high and the other characteristically low relative to 
other states.53 Respondents also were stratified within each state by 
their urban or rural location, another factor previous research sug­
gested was related to award size.54 
The present design avoids the confounding inherent in purely ob­
servational research. By presenting an identical set of injuries to ju­
rors in both states, and in both urban and rural areas, the factorial sur­
vey permits a test of whether awards are a function of where the jurors 
reside (that is, economic and cultural differences between states or be­
tween rural and urban dwellers within states) or of the mix of cases to 
which they are responding. Similarly, by having jurors, judges, and 
lawyers respond to exactly the same group of injuries, the present 
study eliminates the confounding of the decisionmaker with the case 
mix. Thus, unlike passive observational studies, the present design can 
distinguish the attributes of the decisionmakers from the attributes of 
the cases they are deciding. The comparative nature of the present re­
search allows us to see how similar or different the decisionmaking 
groups are in their decision processes and responses. Asking respon­
dents to evaluate injuries on a separate set of scales and to make gen­
eral damages awards allows us to build decision models of both the 
injury-evaluation phase of their thinking and the award-making phase, 
and to compare these decision processes. 
The pattern of findings obtained will imply different diagnoses and 
different policy solutions to improving the process of awarding general 
damages. For example, if jurors' injury severity evaluations or dam­
ages awards were not highly predictable, but no less predictable than 
those of judges and lawyers, that would suggest that the problem is not 
properly ascribed to jurors, but is attributable to the nature of the de­
cisionmaking task, and replacing jurors with judges offers no solution. 
Alternatively, if all groups were equally predictable, but jurors relied 
exclusively on one dimension of injury, such as mental suffering, while 
judges and lawyers relied on a definable mix of all injury attributes, 
then differences between decisionmaker groups would imply system-
52 See PETER H. ROSSI & STEVEN L. NOCK, MEASURING SOCIAL JUDGMENTS: THE 
FACTORIAL SURVEY APPROACH {1982). 
53. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 12. 
54. See generally DANZON, supra note 33. 
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atic differences in decisions and outcomes. Similarly, if jurors showed 
a high degree of unpredictability in both injury evaluations and 
awards, but judges and lawyers showed a high degree of predictability 
in both, then it becomes plausible to think that replacing jurors with 
judges would produce more stable patterns of awards. 
B. Design 
This study is a fractional factorial survey - that is, a fractional ex­
perimental design conducted in the manner of a survey.55 The study 
utilized 62 injury case summaries, grouped into 31 pairs. Each pair 
was heard by a subset of the respondents; each respondent heard one 
injury pair. Thus, injury was both a between- and within-subjects fac­
tor. The respondents were drawn from three populations - jury­
eligible citizens, judges, and lawyers - stratified by rural and urban 
counties in the states of Illinois and New York. Respondents rated 
each injury on several dimensions and provided damages awards. 
1. Case Summaries 
The 62 case summaries were adapted from actual personal injury 
cases56 and represented a broad spectrum of injuries. The injuries en­
compassed different types: nerve damage and paralysis (e.g., quadri­
plegia, temporary paralysis of two fingers); head injuries and brain 
damage (e.g., epilepsy, permanent vegetative state); sensory loss (e.g., 
vision, smell); cuts (e.g., on face, legs); harm to internal organs (e.g., 
loss of kidney, spleen); illnesses (e.g., leukemia, lung cancer); bums 
(e.g., second degree on lower body, third degree over 80% of body); 
and orthopedic injuries (e.g., fracture, sprain, amputation). We did 
not include cases in which the plaintiff had died or in which the plain­
tiff suffered only emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury. 
The case summaries included a description of the nature, severity, 
and location of the injury; the nature, painfulness, duration, and re­
strictions associated with the treatment and healing process; any anxi­
ety, fear, embarrassment, or depression about the injury, its impact, 
treatment, or prognosis; the current status of the plaintiff's pain, dis­
figurement, mental state, and physical impairment; and the likelihood 
and extent of future improvement or deterioration and treatment or 
care needs.57 These injury characteristics were suggested by the legal 
55. See generally ROSSI & NOCK, supra note 52. 
56. The cases were selected from those identified in a study by Baldus et al., supra note 
26. 
57. See Appendix A for several examples of case summaries. 
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literature,58 workers' compensation schedules,59 British compensation 
schedules for personal injury cases,60 and empirical research in this 
area.61 
The case summaries noted the age of the plaintiff, who was said to 
be 37 years old in one case in each pair and 33 years old in the other 
case. The plaintiff's age was specified in order to reduce the variabil­
ity in awards that would result if compensation for future pain and suf­
fering for permanent injuries were based on different life expectancies 
(e.g., if some respondents thought they were compensating a 20-year­
old for 60 years of pain and suffering while others thought they were 
compensating a 60-year-old for 20 years).62 The mid-thirties were cho­
sen as representative of a fairly large range of ages and unlikely to in­
volve special considerations that might arise for young or elderly 
plaintiffs. In order to discover the dimensions along which people 
view injuries and determine awards, independent of other contextual 
factors, no details were supplied about the plaintiff (other than age ),63 
about the defendant, or about the circumstances that caused the inju­
ries.64 
58. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 905, 912 cmt. b (1979); 22 AM. JUR. 2D 
Damages §§ 240-241, 252-256, 269, 271, 275, 293-387 (1988); 1 MARILYN MlNZER ET AL., 
DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS (1993); JEROME MlRzA, ILLINOIS TORT LAW & PRACTICE 
(2d ed. 1989); 36 NY JUR. 20 Damages §§ 56-66, 96-99 (1984); MICHAEL J. POLELLE & 
BRUCE L. OTTLEY, ILLINOIS TORT LAW (1985); Robert W. Phillpott, Jr., ed., Quantum 
Study, 42 LOY. L. REV. 817 (1997); Carl T. Drechsler, Annotation, Excessiveness or Ade­
quacy of Damages Awarded for Injuries to Arms and Hands, 12 A.L.R. 4th 96 (1981); Carl T. 
Drechsler, Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of Damages Awarded for Injuries to Legs 
and Feet, 13 A.L.R. 4th 212 (1981 ). 
59. See ALBERT J. M!LLUS & WILLARD J. GENTILE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 
AND INSURANCE 93-194 (2d ed. 1980); JEFFREY V. NACKLEY, PRIMER ON WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION (2d ed. 1989). 
60. See PETER CANE, ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW (4th ed. 
1987); JUDICIAL STUDIES BOARD, GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL 
DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES (1992); DAVID A. KEMP & MARGARET S. KEMP, 
QUANTUM OF DAMAGES (1992); JOHN MUNKMAN, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND 
DEATH (8th ed. 1989); David A. Kemp, Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss, in DAMAGES 
FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH (David Kemp ed., 1993). 
61. See CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 26; Baldus et al., supra note 26; Hart et al., supra 
note 40; Viscusi, supra note 21; Wissler et al., supra note 27. 
62 See Baldus et al., supra note 26; Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb, supra note 
26. 
63. Respondents who requested more information about the plaintiff were told to as­
sume that the person was of average good health and had an average lifestyle before the in­
jury. 
64. A potential criticism of our methodology is that our findings, based on relatively 
brief injury descriptions, might not be consistent with those that would be obtained with a 
fuller presentation of information, such as at trial. See Vladimir J. Konecni & Ebbe B. Eb­
besen, External Validity of Research in Legal Psychology, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHA v. 39 (1979); 
Wayne Weiten & Shari S. Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The 
Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71 (1979). Few respondents 
commented that they did not have enough information about the injuries themselves; those 
who requested additional information sought contextual information that we had deliber-
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2. Sampling Locations 
Our sample was stratified by state and, within state, by rural and 
urban counties. Illinois was selected to represent a characteristically 
low-award state and New York a high-award state.65 For sampling 
purposes, population density figures were used to designate counties 
as rural or urban.66 In Illinois, Cook County (population density of 
about 5,000 people per square mile) was designated urban and coun­
ties with fewer than 115 people per square mile were designated rural; 
counties with an intermediate population density were not included. 
In New York state, Queens, Bronx, Kings, and New York Counties 
(population densities ranging between 17,000 and 53,000 people per 
square mile) were designated urban. For the jury-eligible sample, 
New York counties with fewer than 200 people per square mile were 
designated rural, and respondents were not drawn from counties with 
an intermediate population density. In order to obtain an adequate 
sample of judges and personal injury lawyers, however, New York 
counties with an intermediate population density were included 
among the rural counties.67 
C. Respondents 
We drew representative samples from three populations: jury­
eligible citizens, judges, and lawyers. 
1. Jurors 
Random-digit dialing was used to obtain the sample of jury-eligible 
(i.e., 18 years or older) citizens (hereafter referred to as "jurors"). 
ately withheld in order to eliminate its potential confounding effects. As discussed in Wiss· 
ler et al., supra note 27, short as opposed to longer injury descriptions did not produce dif­
ferences in injury ratings, awards, or the relationship between the two. 
65. The median 1988-90 jury award in Cook County (Chicago), Illinois, was $32,550, 
compared to from $242,500 to $417,200 in several urban New York counties. See DANIELS 
& MARTIN, supra note 12, at 70-71. When the awards were adjusted for differences in the 
amount in controversy subject to the jurisdiction of courts in the two states, Cook County's 
median award increased to $162,316, but was still well below that of New York urban coun­
ties. Median awards in rural counties ranged from $24,868 to $39,180 in Illinois and from 
$66,000 to $192,500 in New York. See id. 
66. The population density figures were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of the Census at 
its internet site at <WWW.census.gov/population/censusdata/90den_stco.txt>. These designa­
tions were used for sampling purposes only; the rural/urban variable used in the analyses 
relied on the respondents' self-report of where they live Qurors ), where jurors in their courts 
live Qudges ), or where personal injury plaintiffs in their cases live (lawyers). 
67. The population density (number of people per square mile) of these intermediate 
counties was as follows: twelve counties between 200 and 1000, four counties between 1000 
and about 2000, and two counties between approximately 4,500 and 6,500. 
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Five hundred fifty-eight jurors completed an interview.68 Accordingly, 
each injury pair was heard by 18 jurors. Half of the jurors (279) were 
from each state; within each state, two-thirds (186) were from urban 
counties and one-third (93) were from rural counties.69 
The jurors who completed the survey comprised a variety of edu­
cation, income, and age groups. Five percent of jurors had not com­
pleted high school, 24% were high school graduates, 32% had at­
tended college, 24% were college graduates, and 15% had done some 
post-college study or held an advanced degree. Eleven percent of ju­
rors had a household income less than $15,000; 23% from $15,000 to 
$30,000; 31 % from $31,000 to $50,000; 20% from $51,000 to $75,000; 
and 15% over $75,000. The jurors ranged in age from 18 to 92 (mean 
= 41, median = 39). We over-sampled male respondents in order to 
obtain relatively equal numbers of male ( 49%) and female (51 % ) re­
spondents. Only 12 % of the jurors knew someone who suffered from 
the condition in one of the scenarios they heard. · 
2. Judges 
We obtained the names of state general jurisdiction civil trial 
judges from directories and from the court system's administrative of­
fice in each state. Two hundred forty-four judges completed an inter­
view.70 Accordingly, most injury pairs were heard by eight judges, but 
four pairs were heard by only seven judges.71 Approximately half of 
the judges were from each state (124 from Illinois, 120 from New 
York). In Illinois, approximately half of the respondents (52%) were 
68. The response rate for each area was as follows: Illinois urban, 19%; Illinois rural, 
28%; New York urban, 20%; New York rural, 26%. These are conservatively estimated re­
sponse rates. Because the computer-assisted telephone interviewing system used to conduct 
the interviews counted calls, not people, we are unable to obtain more exact response rates 
than these. 
The essential question, however, is whether the respondents are representative of the 
populations from which they are drawn. We found the age, income, and education distribu­
tions of our respondents to approximate fairly closely the distributions of those demographic 
characteristics in each state, as shown by census data. Census data were obtained through 
the United State Census Bureau's world wide web pages: venus.census.gov/cdromllookup/ 
cmd=tables/db=C90STF3Nlev=state/FO=FIPS.state!Fl=stab.geo/sel=36,new [for New 
York] and venus.census.gov/cdromllookup/cmd=tables/db=C90STF3Nlev=state/F0= 
FIPS.state/Fl=stab.geo/sel=17,new [for Illinois]. The exception is that the lowest income and 
education groups are somewhat underrepresented among our respondents, a pattern typical 
of telephone survey research. 
69. When asked where they live, 48% of jurors said a large city, 19% said the suburbs of 
a large city, 7% said a medium-sized city, and 26% said a small town or rural area. For pur­
poses of analysis, the first two categories were designated "urban" and the latter two were 
designated "rural." 
70. The response rate for each area was as follows: Illinois urban, 68%; Illinois rural, 
91 %; New York urban, 54%; New York rural, 62%. 
71. We were unable to get an eighth judge for each of these four pairs due to the rela­
tively small number of civil trial judges in New York courts and their limited availability. 
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from urban and half ( 48%) from rural counties. In New York, due to 
the limited number of judges in rural counties, 71 % of the respondents 
were from urban counties and 29% were from rural counties.72 
Personal injury cases composed from 1 % to 100% of the judges' 
caseload (mean = 52%, median = 50%). The judges had been hearing 
personal injury cases from 1 to 34 years (mean = 9, median = 7). Most 
of the judges (87%) were male. Fifty-seven percent of the judges ei­
ther personally knew someone with the condition or had heard a case 
involving the injury presented in one of the scenarios they were given. 
3. Lawyers 
We obtained the names of lawyers from several different directo­
ries.73 Two hundred forty-eight lawyers completed an interview.74 
Thus, each injury pair was heard by eight lawyers. Half of the lawyers 
(124) were from each state and, within each state, half primarily repre­
sented plaintiffs and half primarily represented defendants. In each 
state, over half of the respondents (56%) were from urban counties 
and almost half ( 44 % ) were from rural counties. 
Personal injury cases composed from 1 % to 100% of the lawyers' 
caseload (mean = 69%, median = 80% ). The lawyers had been han­
dling personal injury cases from 2 to 61 years (mean = 22, median = 
20). Sixty percent of the lawyers had never served as an arbitrator in a 
personal injury case, 14% had done so rarely, 20% occasionally, and 
6% often. Although we over-sampled women lawyers, 90% of those 
interviewed were men. Seventy percent of the lawyers either person­
ally knew someone with the condition or had been involved in a case 
in which the plaintiff had the injury presented in one of the scenarios 
they were given. 
D. Procedures 
Prior to calling the judges and lawyers, we sent each a letter ex­
plaining the purpose of the study, the time involvement, and the con­
fidentiality of their responses, and advising them of the upcoming 
phone call. The mailing included a letter from a prominent member of 
72. When asked where most of the jurors in their courts live, 45% of all judges said a 
large city, 17% said the suburbs of a large city, 9% said a medium-sized city, and 29% said a 
small town or rural area. Thus, across both states, 62% of judges were from urban courts 
and 38% were from rural courts. 
73. These were the Membership Directory of the Defense Research Institute, the Desk 
Reference of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the Martindale-Hubbell Law Di· 
rectory, and West's Legal Directories. 
74. The response rate for each area was as follows: Illinois urban, 83%; Illinois rural, 
86%; New York urban, 70%; New York rural, 74%. 
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their state's legal community urging their participation in our research. 
Jurors did not receive a letter in advance. 
All respondents were contacted by telephone and were asked to 
participate in a study of people's decisions about how much monetary 
compensation an injured person should receive for general damages. 
Respondents were told that they would hear summaries of two cases 
and would be asked to give their reactions to each. Respondents also 
were told that, in an earlier trial, a jury had found the defendant to be 
responsible for the plaintiff's injury and had compensated the plaintiff 
for medical expenses and lost earnings. We emphasized that the re­
spondent was to focus on how much pain and suffering the injury has 
caused the plaintiff and how much money would provide fair compen­
sation for those general damages. 
The interviewer read the respondent the first case summary, fol­
lowed by jury instructions that were adapted from standard instruc­
tions used in each state.75 Although instructions for the two states dif­
fered somewhat and therefore created a slight confounding of 
instructions and population, using instructions that correctly reflected 
the law in each state was necessary to have credible instructions for 
the judges and lawyers. 
Respondents then were asked to indicate how much money they 
would award the plaintiff for general damages, how much they 
thought the average juror would award the plaintiff, and to rate the 
plaintiff's injury on five dimensions. This entire procedure was then 
repeated for the second case. Finally, the respondents were asked so­
ciodemographic questions.76 
E. Measures 
1. Awards for General Damages 
A review of the awards for general damages for each injury re­
vealed that the highest award for some injuries was more than five 
times as large as the second highest award.77 Of the 62 injuries, these 
75. See Appendix B. The instructions used for Illinois respondents were adapted from 
ILLINOIS p ATIERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CivIL, §§ 30.00-30.05 {3d ed. 1994). The instruc­
tions used for New York respondents were adapted from NEW YORK PATIERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS - CivlL § 2:280 {2d ed. 1994). 
76. Appendix B contains the interview protocol used. 
77. Respondents who gave an award of zero were dropped from the study if the reason 
for their award was (a) they felt the defendant was not responsible {despite the fact that the 
stimulus materials had stated that a prior jury already had established the defendant's liabil­
ity), or (b) they did not believe in the concept of compensation for general damages. If a 
potential juror in an actual trial expressed the latter attitude during jury selection, the person 
would be excluded from the jury. During the trial, the judge would admonish a juror ex­
pressing this attitude that the law had established the plaintiff's right to compensation for 
general damages and that one's duty as a juror was to determine a fair amount. Respon­
dents who gave a zero dollar award were retained if they gave reasons such as: the pain was 
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outliers were found in 23 injuries for jurors, 5 for judges, and 6 for 
lawyers. Each outlier was recoded to the value at three standard de­
viations above the mean of the distribution (calculated without the 
outlier). If that recoded value would have altered the rank order of . 
the awards, however, the outlier was recoded instead to the value at 
the next quarter-standard-deviation increment above the second high­
est award. The recoding of outliers to 3 or 4 standard deviations 
above the mean reduced their undue influence on the distribution 
without the loss of data.78 
After this adjustment, the lawyers' and judges' awards for each 
injury showed no serious departures from normality. The jurors' 
awards for some injuries, however, were moderately positively 
skewed. Accordingly, we applied a square root transformation to the 
awards of all three groups.79 The square root transformation ade­
quately reduced the skewness of the jurors' awards without over­
correcting the judges' and lawyers' awards, providing a comparable 
award measure for the three groups.80 
2. Injury Perceptions 
Respondents were asked to give their impressions of the plaintiff's 
injuries on several dimensions, each rated on a five-point, Likert-type 
scale. Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate how much 
physical pain, mental suffering, disability, and disfigurement the given 
injury will have caused the plaintiff. For each of these dimensions, re­
spondents were asked to consider both its amount and duration. Re­
spondents also were asked to indicate how severe the injury was over­
all. 
only temporary; the injury was not disabling, not serious, or caused no permanent damage; 
or the plaintiff was unconscious and, thus, did not experience pain and suffering. 
78. See generally BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTI· 
VARIATE STATISTICS {1983). 
79. The purpose of transforming non-normal distributions is to make them more nearly 
normal in order to use statistical procedures that require normality; to use highly skewed 
distributions could lead to misleading results. It is important to realize that correlations 
among variables depend most heavily on the rank order of cases along each measure and 
much less on the relative distances between the cases. The transformations do not alter the 
rank order. When looking for relationships among variables, the use of such transformations 
advances the effectiveness and validity of the search. Nonetheless some authors have criti­
cized the use of such data transformations on the grounds that "defendants and plaintiffs live 
in a world of real dollars, not of log dollars." Sunstein et al., supra note 51, at 2077 n.21. 
80. A log transformation was not used because it somewhat overcorrected the skewness 
in jurors' awards and substantially overcorrected the judges' and lawyers' awards. 
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3. Sociodemographic Characteristics 
For all members of the three respondent groups, we recorded their 
gender, state, and the rural/urban status of their locale (for jurors, 
where they lived; for judges, where their court's jurors lived; and for 
lawyers, where plaintiffs in their cases lived). In addition, all groups 
were asked whether they knew of someone who had the condition 
presented in either of the scenarios they were given. Jurors also were 
asked their age as well as their education and income level. Judges 
and lawyers were asked what percentage of their caseload was com­
prised of personal injury cases and for how many years they had been 
hearing or handling personal injury cases. The lawyers also were 
asked whether and how frequently they had served as an arbitrator in 
personal injury cases. 
F. Analyses 
1. Overview 
Two sets of analyses were conducted to examine the factors that 
predict respondents' (a) perceptions of the overall severity of the in­
jury, and (b) awards for general damages. For each set of analyses, 
two sets of factors were used as predictors: the respondents' subjec­
tive assessments of the injuries on the dimensions of pain, disability, 
disfigurement, and mental suffering; and the respondents' sociodemo­
graphic characteristics. All measures were standardized in order to 
provide coefficient estimates that could be used to interpret the rela­
tive contribution of the predictors within each model and to facilitate 
the screening of interactions. The analyses were conducted separately 
for jurors, judges, plaintiffs' lawyers, and defense lawyers. 
Each set of analyses consisted of the following. To accommodate 
both the within- and between-subjects aspects of the design, a series of 
mixed linear model analyses was conducted to assess the unique con­
tribution of each predictor. First, all predictors were entered simulta­
neously in a single analysis. Next, interactions among the predictors 
were tested . .  Finally, nonsignificant terms were sequentially elimi­
nated from the model until a final model was obtained that consisted 
of significant interactions and main effects that either were significant 
or were a component of a significant interaction. To assess the collec­
tive predictive strength of the items, multiple regression analyses were 
conducted on the full and final models. In addition, the zero-order 
correlation of each predictor with awards and overall severity was ex­
amined to assess each predictor's total contribution (i.e., both unique 
and shared variance).81 Comparisons of the structure and relative 
81. See Appendix C for a brief summary of some concepts of regression analysis. 
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strength of the models were made across the four respondent groups 
and between the award and severity models. 
2. Order Effects 
The order in which the injuries in each pair were presented was 
counterbalanced. Nonetheless, we examined whether the order of 
presentation affected respondents' awards and ratings. The principal 
effect of order was that jurors' awards were higher for the second in­
jury they heard than for the first one.82 Jurors' ratings of the overall 
severity of the injury were somewhat higher for the first injury they 
heard than for the second one.83 For judges, plaintiffs' lawyers, and 
defense lawyers, the order in which the injuries were heard did not af­
fect awards or overall severity ratings.84 Finding an order effect for ju­
rors but not for judges or lawyers is not surprising, given the jurors' 
lack of experience with determining personal injury awards. 
Ideally, we would have included order as a predictor in the mixed 
models, but we did not so that the sets of analyses across the four re­
spondent groups would be parallel. Order could not be included in 
the models for lawyers because the order in which the injuries were 
heard was confounded with their rural/urban location. The effect of 
excluding order from the jurors' analyses is to increase the error vari­
ance and, thus, to produce a more conservative estimate of the predic­
tive strength of the models. 
IV. REsULTS 
The results will be presented in four Sections. The first presents 
the empirically derived models of the factors that account for judg­
ments of injury severity. Separate models were developed for each 
group of decisionmakers: jurors, judges, plaintiffs' lawyers, and de­
fense lawyers. Each model consists of respondents' ratings of four 
core attributes of injuries - physical pain, mental suffering, disability, 
and disfigurement - plus various demographic factors as predictors. 
The second Section presents models, using the same factors as predic­
tors, to account for respondents' awards of general damages. The 
third Section compares the various decisionmakers' severity assess­
ments, awards, and predictions of how much the "average juror" 
would award for the same injuries. The final Section demonstrates the 
82 F(2,556) = 4.44, p < .05. 
83. F(2,554) = 2.54,p = .08. 
84. For each respondent group, order interacted significantly with several of the predic­
tors when predicting overall severity. When predicting awards, order interacted with pain 
ratings for the jurors, but did not interact with any predictors for the judge or lawyer groups. 
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variability-reducing power of combining individual decisionmakers 
into groups, such as juries. 
A Assessments of Overall Injury Severity: The Role of Injury 
Attributes and Sociodemographic Characteri.stics 
1. Jurors' Assessments 
First, we examined the extent to which jurors' ratings of the inju­
ries on four core attributes and jurors' sociodemographic characteris­
tics predicted their assessments of the overall severity of the injuries. 
Combined in a multiple regression analysis, these factors together ac­
counted for 72% of the variance in jurors' assessments of the injuries' 
overall severity. The four injury attribute ratings combined accounted 
for 71 % of the variance. The sociodemographic characteristics to­
gether accounted for only 3% of the variance in judgments of overall 
severity.85 
To examine which particular factors were related to jurors' assess­
ments of the overall severity of the injuries, jurors' injury ratings and 
sociodemographic characteristics were entered in a mixed linear 
model analysis. Both the full model and the final model are shown in 
Table lA. In the full model, all items were entered simultaneously. 
The final model, which resulted from testing the interactions among 
the predictors and sequentially eliminating nonsignificant terms, in­
cluded only those items that had a significant influence on judgments 
of overall severity or that were a component of a significant interac­
tion. 
The final model also accounted for 72% of the variance. The rat­
ings of each of the four core injury attributes were significantly related 
to assessments of overall injury severity. Perceptions of disability and 
mental suffering had the largest effect on overall severity judgments, 
almost twice as large as the influence of perceptions of pain and dis­
figurement. Higher ratings of the injuries on each of these attributes 
were associated with greater perceived overall injury severity. Com­
paring the relative magnitude of the Betas with the relative magnitude 
of the bivariate correlation coefficients,86 we see that the contributions 
of pain and disfigurement in the multivariate analysis were reduced 
85. The variance accounted for by individual predictors, or groups of predictors, does 
not simply add together to equal the amount of variance accounted for by all of them com­
bined because the components often are somewhat redundant. As here, the total variance 
accounted for seems to be less than the sum of its component parts. Other times, see infra 
Section IV.B.1, the combined variables can account for more than the sum of their parts. 
86. See Table lA. The Betas reflect only the unique contribution of each item, whereas 
the r's reflect both unique and shared contributions combined. For an explanation of the 
statistical terms used in this Section, see Appendix C. 
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because of the variance in severity they shared with disability and 
mental suffering ratings.87 
None of the sociodemographic characteristics had a significant ef­
fect on perceptions of overall injury severity. 88 The main effects of 
state, income, and age were included in the final model because each 
was a component of a significant interaction, not because they them­
selves were significant predictors. 
Several of the injury ratings interacted with other predictors to af­
fect judgments of overall severity: pain and state of residence, pain 
and disability, pain and income, and disfigurement and age. For each 
of the interactions, higher ratings of the injury attribute led to signifi­
cantly higher overall severity ratings at all levels of the other injury 
rating or sociodemographic characteristic, but the size of the effect 
varied depending on the level of the other factor. Specifically, percep­
tions of pain had a larger influence on the overall severity judgments 
for jurors in New York than for jurors in Illinois. In addition, pain 
ratings' contribution to overall severity tended to decrease as the level 
of disability increased and as the jurors' household income increased. 
Disfigurement ratings made a smaller contribution to the severity 
judgments of younger jurors than of other jurors. Although statisti­
cally significant, the contribution of each interaction was small relative 
to that of each of the four injury ratings and did not change the inter­
pretation of the injury ratings' contribution to judgments of overall se­
verity. 
87. The inter-item correlations among the four injury ratings ranged from .49 to .67; the 
correlations among the sociodemographic characteristics ranged from .01 to .18, with the 
exception of r = .45 for income and education; and the correlations between the two sets of 
factors ranged from .01 to .13. 
88. Familiarity with the injury might not have been significantly related to overall se­
verity ratings for several reasons. First, only a relatively small portion {12%) of the jurors 
knew someone with the particular injury they were asked to judge, making it more difficult 
to detect an effect. Second, it is plausible that knowing someone who had a serious injury 
has the opposite effect on severity ratings as does knowing someone who had a minor injury. 
That is, familiarity with a minor injury might confirm its minimal impact and produce lower 
severity ratings than if one were not familiar with that injury. Conversely, an understanding 
of the truly devastating impact of major injuries may produce higher severity ratings than if 
one were not familiar with the injury. These countervailing responses might cancel each 
other out. 
TABLE 1: OVERALL INJURY SEVERITY ASSESSMENTS 
A Jurors' Assessments 
All items entered 
Bivariate simulataneouslJl Fin!!! model 
Variable r Beta F Beta F df 
mental suffering .74 .34 195.76*** .34 193.65*** (1,478) 
pain .59 .16 57.27*** .19 53.86*** (1,478) 
disability .75 .37 221.73*** .35 209.17*** (1,478) 
disfigurement .61 .15 47.06*** .17 57.58*** (1,478) 
state -.01 .05 2.27 .05 2.29 
rural/urban .09 -.06 2.29 -- --
gender .03 .04 1.23 -- --
income -.10 .03 2.10 .03 2.21 (1,504) 
education -.12 -.03 1.89 -- --
age -.03 -.02 1.83 -.03 2.96+ (1,504) 
familiar with injury -.02 .01 .22 -- --
(R2 = .72) -.08 5.68* (1,478) 
-.05 7.48** (1,478) 
-.04 5.24* (1,478) 
.04 5.01* (1,478) 
(R2 = .72) 
Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .02 to .03. 
*** p < .001 
** p < .01 
* p < .05 
+ p < .10 
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2. Judges' Assessments 
The same approach was used to model and account for judges' as­
sessments of overall injury severity. Ratings of injuries on the four 
core attributes, together with the judges' sociodemographic charac­
teristics, accounted for 70% of the variance in their assessments of the 
injuries' severity. The four injury attribute ratings accounted for 69% 
of the variance; the sociodemographic characteristics combined ac­
counted for only 2% of the variance in judgments of overall severity. 
In the final model, which accounted for 69% of the variance, rat­
ings of each of the four core injury attributes were significantly related 
to assessments of overall injury severity (see Table lB). Ratings of the 
extent of disability made the largest contribution to overall severity 
judgments, followed by ratings of mental suffering. Ratings of disfig­
urement and pain also made significant, although substantially 
smaller, contributions to perceptions of severity. Higher ratings of the 
injuries on each of these attributes were associated with greater per­
ceived overall injury severity. Comparing the relative magnitude of 
the Betas with that of the bivariate correlation coefficients, we can see 
that the contributions of mental suffering, disfigurement, and pain 
ratings were reduced because of the variance in overall severity that 
they shared with disability ratings.89 
None of the sociodemographic characteristics made a significant 
contribution to perceptions of overall injury severity. However, the 
state in which the judges presided interacted with disability ratings to 
affect overall severity judgments. Specifically, disability made a larger 
contribution to overall severity ratings for New York judges than for 
Illinois judges. Because higher disability ratings led to significantly 
higher overall severity ratings for both New York and Illinois judges, 
the interaction did not alter the interpretation of disability's influence 
on severity judgments. The contribution of the interaction was similar 
in magnitude to the contribution of disfigurement and pain ratings. 
89. The inter-item correlations among the four injury ratings ranged from .39 to .60; the 
correlations among the sociodemographic characteristics ranged from .02 to .33, with the 
exception of r = .55 for the percentage of personal injury cases in the judges' caseload and 
rural/urban location; and the correlations between the two sets of factors ranged from .01 to 
.14. 
Variable 
mental suffering 
pain 
disability 
disfigurement 
state 
rural/urban 
gender 
familiar with injury 
TABLE 1: OVERALL INJURY SEVERITY ASSESSMENTS (CONTINUED) 
B. Judges' Assessments 
All items entered 
Bivariate simulataneousl� Final model 
r Beta F Beta F df 
.71 .34 88.S6*** .33 87.21*** (1,206) 
.46 .10 8.78** .09 9.07** (1,206) 
.76 .48 176.33*** .S3 177.71*** (1,206) 
.49 .08 6.S2* .10 10.16** (1,206) 
.07 -.03 .33 -.01 .OS (1,23S) 
.OS .08 1.S3 
.04 .OS .33 
-.06 -.01 .13 
% caseload that is personal injury .11 .02 .37 
# years hearing pi cases .03 -.02 .63 
Interactions 
(R2 = .70) -.13 S.72* (1,206) disability x state 
Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .03 to .OS. 
*** p < .001 
** p <  .01 
* p < .OS 
(R2 = .69) 
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3. Plaintiffs' Lawyers' Assessments 
Together, the plaintiffs' lawyers' injury ratings and their sociode­
mographic characteristics accounted for 78% of the variance in their 
judgments of the injuries' overall severity. The four injury attribute 
ratings accounted for 78% of the variance; the sociodemographic vari­
ables together accounted for only 3 % of the variance in judgments of 
overall severity. 
In the final model, which also accounted for 78% of the variance, 
ratings on each of the four core injury attributes made a significant 
contribution to assessments of overall severity. Ratings of the extent 
of disability made the largest contribution to judgments of overall se­
verity, followed by mental suffering (see Table lC). Ratings of pain 
and disfigurement made significant but considerably smaller contribu­
tions. Higher ratings of the injury on each of these dimensions con­
tributed to greater perceived overall injury severity. The contribution 
of mental suffering, pain, and disfigurement ratings in the multivariate 
analysis was reduced because of the variance in overall severity ratings 
shared with disability.90 
None of the sociodemographic characteristics made a significant 
contribution to perceptions of overall severity.91 Rural/urban setting 
interacted with ratings of mental suffering to influence judgments of 
overall injury severity, although it did not alter the interpretation of 
the relationship of mental suffering and severity. Mental suffering 
made a slightly greater contribution to severity ratings for plaintiffs' 
lawyers whose clients came mostly from rural settings than for those 
whose clients came mostly from urban settings. The contribution of 
this interaction was comparable to that of the pain and disfigurement 
ratings. 
90. The inter-item correlations among the four injury ratings ranged from .40 to .53; the 
correlations among the sociodemographic characteristics ranged from .01 to .33; and the cor­
relations between the two sets of factors ranged from .01 to .16. 
91. The number of years that the plaintiffs' lawyers had been handling personal injury 
cases was not included in the multivariate analyses because of missing data. But it appears 
from the very small bivariate correlation between number of years in personal injury prac­
tice and overall severity ratings, r{l47) = -.01, that no relationship exists between these vari­
ables. 
TABLE 1: OVERALL INJURY SEVERITY ASSESSMENTS (CONTINUED) 
C. Plaintiffs' Lawyers' Assessments 
Variable 
mental suffering 
pain 
disability 
disfigurement 
state 
ruraVurban 
gender 
familiar with injury 
% caseload that is personal injury 
how often serve as pi arbitrator 
Bivariate 
r 
.80 
.S7 
.80 
.S2 
-.04 
.08 
.07 
-.07 
.OS 
-.02 
All items entered 
simulata·neously 
Beta F 
.40 67.74*** 
.11 7.28** 
.44 86.4S"'** 
.10 6.47* 
-.03 .23 
.01 .02 
-.07 .46 
.OS 1.88 
-.01 .11 
-.01 .01 
(R2 = .78) 
Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .04 to .06. 
*** p < .001 
** p < .01 
* p < .OS 
Beta 
.32 
.12 
.4S 
.11 
.01 
.13 
Final model 
F df 
70.lS*** (1,106) 
8.8S** (1,106) 
99.72**"' (1,106) 
7.74** (1,106) 
.01 (1,121) 
4.07* (1,106) 
(R2 = .78) 
Interactions 
mental suffering x ruraVurban 
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4. Defense Lawyers' Assessments 
Defense lawyers' injury attribute ratings and their sociodemo­
graphic characteristics together accounted for 75% of the variance in 
their assessments of the injuries' overall severity. The four injury rat­
ings accounted for 75% of the variance; the sociodemographic charac­
teristics together accounted for only 1 % of the variance. 
The final model accounted for 75% of the variance. Perceptions of 
mental suffering made the largest contribution to assessments of over­
all severity in the final model (see Table 1D), followed by disability 
ratings. Ratings of disfigurement made a significant though substan­
tially smaller contribution to overall severity. Pain ratings made no 
significant independent contribution to overall severity judgments, but 
instead influenced overall severity indirectly through pain's relation­
ship with the other injury attributes. Comparing the relative magni­
tude of the Betas with the relative magnitude of the bivariate correla­
tion coefficients, we see that the effect of pain, and to a lesser extent 
disfigurement, in the multivariate analysis was reduced because of 
shared variance.92 
None of the sociodemographic variables made a significant contri­
bution to perceptions of overall injury severity,93 and none of the pre­
dictors interacted significantly to influence severity ratings. 
92. The inter-item correlations among the four injury ratings ranged from .31 to .46, 
with the exception of r = .72 for disability and mental suffering; the correlations among the 
sociodemographic characteristics ranged from .01 to .21; and the correlations between the 
two sets of factors ranged from .01 to .13. 
93. The number of years that the defense lawyers had been handling personal injury 
cases was not included in the multivariate analyses because of missing data. But it appears 
from the very small bivariate correlation between number of years in personal injury prac­
tice and overall severity ratings, r(165) = .04, that no relationship exists between these vari­
ables. 
TABLE 1: OVERALL INJURY SEVERITY ASSESSMENTS (CONTINUED) 
D. Defense Lawyers' Assessments 
All items entered 
Bivariate simulataneousl:i 
Variable r Beta F 
mental suffering .79 .48 101.66**"' 
pain .46 .05 1.77 
disability .79 .37 56.01*** 
disfigurement .47 .10 8.04** 
state .02 -.05 .57 
ruraVurban .03 .05 .42 
gender -.06 .08 .31 
familiar with injury -.07 .01 .01 
% caseload that is personal injury -.01 -.04 .88 
how often serve as pi arbitrator -.09 .04 1.13 
(R' = .75) 
Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .03 to .05. 
*** p <  .001 
** p < .01 
Beta 
.47 
.39 
.11 
Final model 
F df Interactions 
105.19*** (l,110) 
69.54*** 
10.36** 
(R2 = .75) 
(1,110) 
(1,110) 
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5. Comparison of Injury Severity Models Across the Four Groups 
By comparing the final models for each group of decisionmakers, 
we can learn about the factors, the weights of those factors, and the 
predictability of the judgments of overall severity made by jurors, 
judges, and lawyers. The similarities among these diverse decisiort­
makers are far more striking than their differences. The judgments of 
all four groups were highly predictable, and the factors that had great 
influence - as well as those that had little or no influence - were 
very similar among all groups. 
The predictability of severity judgments, as measured by the total 
proportion of variance accounted for by each of the final models, was 
large and similar for each of the groups: 72% for jurors, 69% for 
judges, 78% for plaintiffs' lawyers, and 75% for defense lawyers. For 
all groups, variation in severity ratings was to a far greater extent the 
product of differences in the injuries being responded to than it was 
the product of individual differences among the respondents. The 
variation of responses of different people to the same injury was small 
and similar across the four groups.94 That is, members of each group 
responded similarly in assessing the severity of the injuries involved in 
a given case. And, as one should expect, the variation in responses of 
the same person to different injuries was many times larger than that 
of different people to the same injury.95 
For all four groups, the only main effects that remained in the filial 
models as significant predictors of overall severity were the core injury 
attributes - none of the socio-demographic characteristics made a 
significant contribution. For jurors, judges, and plaintiffs' lawyers, 
disability made the largest contribution, followed by mental suffering; 
pain and disfigurement made significant but smaller contributions. 
The model for defense lawyers differed from the other three in that 
mental suffering was the most powerful influence while disability was 
second,96 and pain did not make a significant unique contribution to 
overall severity. Interactions involving sociodemographic characteris­
tics played only a small role in the models: the magnitude of their in­
fluence was fairly small, and none changed the interpretation of the 
injury ratings' influence on overall severity assessments. 
94. The between-subjects covariance parameter estimate was .006 for jurors, -.008 for 
judges, -.003 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and .06 for defense lawyers. 
95. The within-subjects covariance parameter estimate was .27 for jurors, .31 for judges, 
.23 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and .17 for defense lawyers. 
96. Shared variance could explain the reduced impact of disability for defense lawyers 
compared to the other groups. For them, the correlation between disability and mental suf­
fering was r = .72, while it was smaller for the other groups. 
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B. Predicting General Damages Awards: Translating Injury 
Judgments into Dollars 
783 
The same predictive data and the same modeling techniques as 
above were used to account for the general damages awards. In con­
trast to the high degree of predictability of perceptions of injury se­
verity, models for general damages awards show less prediCtability and 
greater decisionmaking complexity. Even so, across the groups of de­
cisionmakers, a considerable degree of similarity remains in the pat­
terns of variables that influence the damages awards. 
1. Jurors' Awards 
We examined the extent to which jurors' perceptions of the inju­
ries on the four core attributes97 and their sociodemographic charac­
teristics predicted awards (which had been square-root transformed). 
Combined in a multiple regression analysis, these factors accounted 
for 21 % of the variance in awards. Ratings of the four core injury at­
tributes accounted for 17% of the variance; the sociodemographic 
characteristics accounted for only 2 % of the variance in awards. 
The final model accounted for 23% of the variance in awards for 
general damages. Of the four injury ratings, perceptions of disability 
had the greatest impact on awards, more than twice as large as ratings 
of either mental suffering or disfigurement (see Table 2A). Higher 
ratings of the injury on each of these three attributes were associated 
with larger awards. Pain ratings did not have a significant unique ef­
fect on awards when combined with the other predictors. Given the 
bivariate correlation between pain ratings and awards, pain apparently 
affected awards through its relationship with the other injury ratings. 
The influence of pain ratings, and to a lesser extent disfigurement and 
mental suffering, was reduced in the multivariate· analysis due to the 
variance in awards shared with disability. 
Of the sociodemographic characteristics, gender .was the most 
strongly related to awards. In fact, the magnitude of gender's influ­
ence on awards was second only to that of disability. Income also had 
a significant but smaller influence on awards. Male jurors gave larger 
awards than female jurors, and jurors with higher household incomes 
gave larger awards than those with lower incomes. 
Several of the predictors interacted to affect awards in a manner 
that altered the interpretation of the injury attributes' influence on 
awards. Examining the interaction of disfigurement ratings with 
rural/urban residence showed that as perceptions of disfigurement in-
97. Because the four specific injury ratings were highly correlated with overall severity 
ratings, overall injury severity was not included as a predictor of. awards in order to avoid 
multicollinearity. 
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creased, awards increased for urban jurors but not for rural jurors. 
The nature of the interaction of pain ratings and education was such 
that as pain ratings increased, awards increased for those jurors who 
were college graduates but not for jurors with other levels of educa­
tion. Finally, the interaction of disfigurement and disability ratings 
showed that as the perception of disfigurement increased, awards in­
creased only at the higher levels of disability, while higher disability 
ratings were related to larger awards at all levels of disfigurement. 
The influence of each of these interactions was similar in magnitude to 
the impact of mental suffering and disfigurement ratings and house­
hold income. 
In sum, jurors gave larger awards when they saw the injuries as in­
volving a greater degree of disability and mental suffering and when 
the jurors were male or had a higher household income. Greater per­
ceived disfigurement led to giving larger awards only when it was as­
sociated with higher levels of disability and only for urban jurors. 
Greater perceived pain led to giving larger awards only for college 
graduates. 
TABLE 2: P A1N AND SUFFERING AWARDS (SQUARE-ROOT TRANSFORMED) 
A. Jurors' Awards 
All items entered 
Bivariate simulataneousl)! Final model 
Variable r Beta F Beta F 
mental suffering .34 .13 10.61** .13 10.69** 
pain .24 .02 .24 .02 .38 
disability .38 .28 46.54*** .31 57.06*** 
disfigurement .32 .12 10.86** .15 4.59* 
state .05 -.05 .61 
ruraVurban .08 -.05 .47 -.05 .45 
gender -.12 .26 15.79*** .26 15.74*** 
income .07 .11 8.25** .11 8.41** 
education .07 .05 2.21* .06 2.63 
age .02 .02 .40 
familiar with injury -.01 .02 .44 
(R2 = .21) -.13 5.28* 
.10 12.88*** 
.08 7.23*** 
(R' = .23) 
Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .03 to .07. 
*** p <  .001 
** p < .01 
* p < .05 
df 
(1,481) 
(1,481) 
(1,481) 
(1,481) 
(1,505) 
(1,505) 
(1,505) 
(1,505) 
(1,481) 
(1,481) 
(1,481) 
-
Interactions 
disfigurement x ruraVurban 
pain x education 
disfigurement x disability 
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2. Judges' Awards 
Judges' perceptions of the injuries and their sociodemographic 
characteristics accounted for 44 % of the variance in square-root 
awards. The four injury attributes accounted for 40% of the variance; 
the sociodemographic variables accounted for only 4 % of the variance 
in awards. · 
The final model accounted for 42% of the variance in judges' 
awards for general damages. Of the four injury ratings, disability had 
the greatest influence on awards, almost twice as large as that of men­
tal suffering (see Table 2B). Disfigurement ratings had a smaller, but 
significant, impact on awards. Higher ratings of the injury on each of 
these three dimensions were associated with larger awards. Percep­
tions of pain did not have a significant unique influence on awards 
when combined with the other predictors, although its bivariate cor­
relation with awards was moderate. Pain apparently does not affect 
awards independently but does so through its relationship with the 
other ratings. The effect of perceptions of pain, and to a lesser extent 
perceptions of mental suffering and disfigurement, was reduced be­
cause of shared variance. 
Of the sociodemographic characteristics, only the state in which 
the judges presided affected their awards. New York judges gave 
larger general damages awards than did Illinois judges. Additionally, 
the state in which the judges presided interacted with disability ratings 
to affect awards. Specifically, disability had a greater impact on 
awards for New York judges than for Illinois judges, although higher 
disability ratings led to significantly larger awards in both states. The 
influences of the state and of the interaction were similar in magnitude 
to the effect of perceptions of mental suffering. 
In sum, judges gave larger awards when they saw the injuries as in­
volving a greater degree of disability, mental suffering, and disfigure­
ment, and when the judges presided in New York courts rather than in 
Illinois courts. Perceived disability had a greater effect on awards for 
New York judges than for Illinois judges. 
TABLE 2: PAIN AND SUFFERING AW ARDS (CONTINUED) ti (1) g 
B. Judges' Awards � (1) ... 
...... 
All items entered \0 \0 
Bivariate simulataneousl:i Final model .!£ 
Variable r Beta F Beta F df Interactions 
mental suffering .53 .24 26.41*** .25 27.85*** (1,212) 
pain .36 .04 .75 -- --
disability .58 .34 51.95*** .49 68.06*** (1,212) 
disfigurement .38 .13 8.66** .12 8.02** (1,212) 
state .14 -.22 8.42** -.23 10.40** (1,236) 
rural/urban .12 -.12 1.69 -- -- � gender .02 .14 1.41 -- --
familiar with injury -.04 -.03 .49 -- -- (1) i::i % caseload that is personal injury .11 .01 .07 -- -- -
# years hearing pi cases -.01 -.04 1.30 -- -- ti l:l (R2 = .44) -.21 9.56** (1,212) disability x state ::! 
(R2 = .42) � 
� 
Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .04 to .07. 
*** p <  .001 
** p <  .01 
� 
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3. Plaintiffs' Lawyers' Awards 
Plaintiffs' lawyers' perceptions of the injuries and their sociodemo­
graphic characteristics accounted for 37% of the variance in their 
square-root awards. The four injury attributes accounted for 34 % of 
the variance; the set of sociodemographic characteristics accounted for 
only 1 % of the variance in awards. 
The final model accounted for 48% of the variance in awards for 
general damages. Of the four injury attributes, disability had the 
greatest impact on awards in the final model, followed by mental suf­
fering (see Table 2C). Higher ratings of the injury along these dimen­
sions were associated with larger awards. Perceptions of pain and dis­
figurement did not have a significant effect on awards in the 
multivariate analysis, despite their moderate bivariate correlations 
with awards. Thus, pain and disfigurement did not affect awards inde­
pendently but through their relationship with the other ratings. 
Of the sociodemographic characteristics, only the state in which 
plaintiffs' lawyers practiced had even a marginally significant influence 
on awards. Specifically, New York plaintiffs' lawyers tended to award 
more than did Illinois plaintiffs' lawyers. None of the other demo­
graphic characteristics were associated with awards.98 
Several of the predictors interacted, having a substantial effect on 
awards and altering the interpretation of the effect of injury attributes 
and demographic characteristics on awards. First, the state in which 
the lawyers practiced interacted with how often they had served as an 
arbitrator in personal injury cases. New York plaintiffs' lawyers who 
had frequently served as arbitrators gave larger awards than those 
who had served less often, while the pattern was reversed for Illinois 
plaintiffs' lawyers. Second, the interaction of familiarity with the type 
of injury presented and rural/urban practice indicated that familiarity 
with the injury led to significantly larger awards for urban plaintiffs' 
lawyers but had no effect on rural lawyers' awards. Third, the interac­
tion of disfigurement and disability ratings showed that perceptions of 
greater disfigurement were significantly related to larger awards only 
at the highest level of disability, while higher disability ratings were 
related to larger awards at all levels of disfigurement. Fourth, disabil­
ity perceptions and state interacted such that although higher disabil­
ity ratings were related to larger awards for plaintiffs' lawyers in both 
states, the magnitude of the relationship between disability ratings and 
awards was almost twice as large in New York as in Illinois. Finally, 
98. The number of years that the plaintiffs' lawyers had been handling personal injury 
cases was not included in the multivariate analyses because of missing data, but it appears 
from the very small bivariate correlation between number of years in personal injury prac­
tice and awards, r(148) = .05, that no relationship exists between these variables. 
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perceived disability interacted with the frequency with which the law­
yers had served as arbitrators, but no systematic, interpretable pattern 
appeared. 
In sum, plaintiffs' lawyers gave larger awards when they saw the 
injuries as involving a greater degree of disability and mental suffer­
ing. If they practiced in New York rather than in Illinois, they were 
marginally more likely to give larger awards. Moreover, five different 
interaction effects emerged, consisting of complex relationships in­
volving either the perception of disability or the location (state as well 
as urban/rural) of their law practice. 
TABLE 2: PAIN AND SUFFERING AW ARDS (CONTINUED) 
c. Plaintiffs' Lawyers' Awards 
All items entered 
Bivariate simulataneousl� 
Variable r Beta F 
mental suffering .50 .26 10.94** 
pain .35 -.03 .18 
disability .53 .28 13.93*** 
disfigurement .40 .11 2.81+ 
state .02 -.18 3.18+ 
rural/urban .05 .05 .17 
gender -.05 .20 1.73 
familiar with injury -.01 .09 2.8+ 
% caseload that is personal injury .02 -.02 .17 
how often serve as pi arbitrator .06 .06 1.23 
(R2 = .37) 
Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .05 to .11. 
*** p < .001 
** p < .01 
* p < .05 
+ p < .10 
Final model 
Beta F df 
.28 17.16•** (1,106) 
.46 27.28*** (1,106) 
.05 .63 (1,106) 
-.19 3.89+ (1,118) 
.06 .42 (1,118) 
-- --
.20 2.46 (1,118) 
-- --
.30 1.97 (1;118) 
-.44 17.03*** (1,118) 
-.25 6.88* (1,106) 
.23 17.05**• (1,106) 
-.21 4.97• "(1,106) 
.14 8.60** (1,106) 
(R2 =.48) 
Interactions 
how often pi arbitrator x state 
familiar with injury x rural/urban 
disability x disfigurement 
disability x state 
disability x how often pi arbitrator 
-...] 
l.O 
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4. Defense Lawyers' Awards 
Defense lawyers' perceptions of the injuries and their sociodemo­
graphic characteristics accounted for 52 % of the variance in their 
square-root awards. The four specific injury ratings combined ac­
counted for 50% of the variance in awards; the sociodemographic 
characteristics together accounted for 4 % of the variance in awards. 
The final model accounted for 58% of the variance in general 
damages awards. Perceptions of mental suffering had the greatest im­
pact on awards (see Table 2D). Disability and disfigurement ratings 
also had a significant effect on awards. Higher ratings of the injury on 
each of these dimensions were associated with larger awards. Pain 
ratings had no significant independent effect on awards, despite a 
moderate bivariate correlation. Thus, pain influenced awards indi­
rectly through its relationship with the other injury ratings. The influ­
ences of disfigurement and disability also were somewhat reduced be­
cause of the variance in awards they shared with the other injury 
ratings. 
The state in which the defense lawyers practiced was the only soci­
odemographic characteristic to have a significant effect on awards.99 
Defense lawyers practicing in New York awarded more than those in 
Illinois. The magnitude of the impact of state on awards was compa­
rable to that of disability ratings. 
Several of the predictors interacted to affect awards. The signifi­
cant interaction of mental suffering and perceived di�ability had an ef­
fect on awards comparable in magnitude to that of disability ratings 
and the state in which the lawyers practiced. The nature of this inter­
action was such that greater perceived disability resulted in larger 
awards only at the highest level of mental suffering, while greater per­
ceived mental suffering led to larger awards at each level of disability, 
with an increasing impact as the level of disability increased. The in­
teraction of pain and disfigurement ratings showed that greater per­
ceived pain led to larger awards only at the highest level of disfigure­
ment, and greater perceived disfigurement led to larger awards only at 
moderate and severe levels of pain. Finally, the interaction of per­
ceived disfigurement with the proportion of the defense lawyers' 
caseload that was personal injury work showed that higher disfigure­
ment ratings were significantly related to larger awards only for those 
defense lawyers for whom personal injury cases comprised half or less 
99. The number of years that the defense lawyers had been handling personal injury 
cases was not included in the multivariate analyses because of missing data, but it appears 
from the very small bivariate correlation between number of years in personal injury prac­
tice and awards, r(166) = -.08, that no relationship exists between these variables. 
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of their caseload. The influence of these latter two interactions on 
awards was comparable in magnitude to that of disfigurement ratings. 
In sum, defense lawyers gave larger awards when they saw the in­
juries as involving a greater degree of mental suffering, disability, and 
disfigurement and if they practiced in New York rather than in 
Illinois. The influence of disability, disfigurement, and pain was quali­
fied by three significant interactions with other predictors. 
TABLE 2: PAIN AND SUFFERING AW ARDS (CONTINUED) 
D. Defense Lawyers' Awards 
All items entered 
Bivariate simulataneousl� 
Variable r Beta F 
mental suffering .66 .38 31.21*** 
pain .37 .03 .23 
disability .60 .23 10.26** 
disfigurement .47 .18 11.85*** 
state .10 -.24 7.54** 
rural/urban .03 -.02 .04 
gender -.01 -.15 .59 
familiar with injury -.10 -.01 .01 
% caseload that is personal injury -.06 -.05 1.00 
how often serve as pi arbitrator -.i4 -.03 .40 
(R2 = .52} 
Note: In the final model, the standard error of the Betas ranged from .04 to .08. 
*** p < .001 
** p < .01 
Final model 
Beta F df 
.40 39.32*** (1,104) 
.03 .46 (1,104) 
.23 11.77*** {l,104) 
.14 8.53** {1,104) 
-.24 8.28** {l,120) 
-- --
-- --
-- --
-.06 1.82 {1,120) 
-- --
.20 15.19*** (1,104) 
.13 8.58** (1,104) 
-.12 8.18** {1,104) 
{R2 = .58) 
0 
8 � (1) ... 
..... \0 \0 � 
Interactions 
� 
Cl> 
i:l -
t:J 
mental suffering x disability � 
pain x disfigurement l:l � disfigurement x % caseload pi <-> 
� 
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5. Comparison of Award Models Across the Four Groups 
Earlier, we had seen that the regression models predicting overall 
injury severity ratings for all four groups of decisionmakers showed 
the groups to be remarkably similar in nearly every respect. The re­
gression models in this Section aim to account for variation in the gen­
eral damages awards. With these models, we see a decline in predict­
ability for all four groups and greater divergence among them. At the 
same time, important parallels continue to exist. 
The final models for each group accounted for a moderate propor­
tion of the variance in awards: 23% for jurors, 42% for judges, 48% 
for plaintiffs' lawyers, and 58% for defense lawyers. Although it is 
more difficult to predict the awards made by all of these decisionmak­
ers, the translation from perceptions of injury severity to damages 
awards has led to the greatest decline in predictability for the model of 
jurors' decisions. Of course, this may be as much a statement about 
the limitations of the predictive model to capture what jurors are do­
ing as it is a statement about the jurors' decisions. 
Nonetheless, confirming the preceding impressions, the variation 
of responses of different people to the same injury was greater for ju­
rors than for the other groups.100 These patterns of predictability and 
intra-injury variability in awards are not surprising, given that jurors 
have essentially no experience assigning a dollar value to injuries 
while the other groups do. In addition, had we been able to include an 
order term in the jurors' model to reflect the fact that there was a sig­
nificant order effect for jurors (which was not found for the other 
groups), the error variance for jurors likely would have been re­
duced.101 
For all groups, the variation in responses of the same person to dif­
ferent injuries was much larger than that of different decisionmakers 
to the same injury.102 The somewhat lower variability in awards for 
defense lawyers when the same person was reacting to different inju­
ries suggests they may be less responsive to case details. Thus, the 
greater predictability of awards for defense lawyers does not necessar­
ily mean they are "better" at this task, but instead that their responses 
might be less nuanced or more mechanical. 
For all groups, some of the variability in awards might be due to 
the fact that, in order to avoid potentially confounding contextual fac­
tors, the case summaries did not describe the plaintiffs or their pre-
100. The between-subjects covariance parameter estimate was .21 for jurors, compared 
to .06 for judges, .01 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and .02 for defense lawyers 
101. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
102. The within-subjects covariance parameter estimate was .56 for jurors, .47 for 
judges, .48 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and 35 for defense lawyers. 
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injury lifestyles. Depending on the extent of changes in a plaintiff's 
work, family, and recreational life, the same injury could be seen to 
have a different impact on different plaintiffs and, thus, merit different 
awards. Numerous judges and lawyers requested information about 
the plaintiff's gender, occupation, lifestyle, family, and other back­
ground details.103 For instance, some wanted to know the plaintiff's 
gender because they felt a scar on a female plaintiff's face would war­
rant more compensation than the same injury for a male plaintiff. 
Thus, award variability might be greater because respondents brought 
different assumptions about the plaintiff to bear on the task.104 
The respondent groups showed important similarities in the role 
that injury attributes played in their awards, but also some differences. 
For all four groups, pain ratings had no significant unique influence on 
awards. For jurors, judges, and plaintiffs' lawyers, perceptions of dis­
ability had the greatest impact on awards - about twice as large as the 
impact of the second strongest predictor - while for defense lawyers, 
perceptions of mental suffering had the largest effect on awards. Men­
tal suffering had a significant effect on awards for all four groups. 
Perceived disfigurement had a significant impact on awards for all 
groups except plaintiffs' lawyers. For all groups except judges, the in­
terpretation of the effect of some of the injury attributes was qualified 
by significant interactions with the sociodemographic characteristics. 
In all instances, higher ratings on the injury attributes were associ­
ated with larger awards. This suggests considerable vertical equity in 
awards - that all groups gave larger awards to plaintiffs with injuries 
involving a greater degree of disability, mental suffering, and (except 
for plaintiffs' lawyers) disfigurement. Additional data provide evi­
dence of considerable vertical equity for all groups. For each injury, 
the mean award and mean assessment of overall injury severity were 
calculated within each respondent group. These items then were cor­
related, using the injury scenario as the unit of analysis (n = 62). The 
correlation between overall severity and awards was .83 for jurors, .88 
103. Recall that, if they inquired, respondents were told that the plaintiff was of average 
good health and had an average lifestyle before the injury, which seemed to be sufficient 
information for most of the respondents. 
104. It is interesting to note that, during the interviews, lawyers and judges requested 
information that, legally, should have no relevance for awards for general damages, but 
which revealed their own search for shortcuts to estimating general damages. For instance, 
they wanted to know the amount of the plaintiff's medical expenses and lost wages so that 
they could use a formula to calculate awards for general damages. That judges and lawyers 
sometimes grasped at such shortcuts suggests that they did not have much better bearings 
than jurors in the chartless seas of determining general damages awards. They also wanted 
to know the effect of the injury on employment status. Relatedly, Vidmar & Rice, supra 
note 18, at 896-97, found that experienced lawyers serving as arbitrators tended to make 
more improper use of information than lay jurors had, such as using evidence of liability to 
fix damages and increasing the size of awards to cover attorneys' fees. 
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for judges, .77 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and .88 for defense lawyers.105 
Thus, all groups gave larger awards to plaintiffs with injuries seen as 
more severe and smaller awards to plaintiffs with injuries viewed as 
less severe. 
One or more demographic variables had a significant and large ef­
fect on the awards for each of the four groups. Judges and lawyers in 
New York gave larger awards than did their counterparts in Illinois.106 
Comparing the moderate multivariate influence of state on awards 
with its smaller bivariate relationship in each of these groups suggests 
that state suppressed irrelevant variance in the other variables in the 
equation. This may suggest that a constellation of subtle differences 
exists between New York and Illinois judges and lawyers, which in the 
multivariate analysis is captured by the single variable of state. For 
jurors, the state in which they lived was not related to awards, but 
gender and household income were, with male jurors and jurors with 
higher incomes giving larger awards.107 
C. Comparing Jurors', Judges', and Lawyers' Injury 
Severity Assessments, Awards, and Predictions 
of the "Average Juror's" Awards 
Next, we compare the general tendencies of jurors, judges, plain­
tiffs' lawyers, and defense lawyers, as groups, to perceive injuries as 
more or less serious and to give awards that are relatively higher or 
lower. In addition, we report a number of analyses relating to respon­
dents' estimates of what the "average juror" would award. 
105. Calculating these correlations without first averaging across people, that is, using 
the respondent instead of the injury as the unit of analysis, produces these relationships: .38 
for jurors, .65 for judges, .61 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and .71 for defense lawyers. The lower 
correlation for jurors no doubt reflects the greater variability noted above. 
106. Larger awards by New York judges and lawyers may reflect the fact that New York 
instructions explicitly include compensation for "loss of enjoyment of life," while the Illinois 
instructions do not specify that this component should be considered in determining general 
damages. Compare NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - ClvIL § 2:280.1 (2d ed. 
1994) with ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Clv!L, §§ 30.00 - 30.05 (3d ed. 1994). 
Cutting the other way, New York instructions direct that compensation be given only for 
conscious pain and suffering, while Illinois instructions do not address this issue. Compare 
NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - ClvIL § 2:280 cmt. (2d ed. 1994) with ILLINOIS 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Clv!L, § 30.05 (3d ed. 1994). Although this difference 
would tend to produce smaller awards in New York, it was unlikely to have much effect in 
the present study because the plaintiff was not conscious of her or his condition in only two 
of our 62 injuries. 
107. Gender might not have been related to awards for judges or lawyers because only a 
relatively small portion of each group was female (13% of judges, 13% of plaintiffs' lawyers, 
and 7% of defense lawyers), making it more difficult to detect an effect. Or perhaps because 
they have learned to see damages in similar ways regardless of their gender. 
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1. Comparison of Overall Severity Assessments 
Do the four different groups of decisionmakers, in the two differ­
ent states, vary in their perceptions of the severity of the injuries, so 
that some see the same injury as more severe and others see it as less 
severe? To answer this question, for each respondent group, the mean 
overall severity rating was calculated for each injury, separately within 
each state. Table 3 presents these data, averaged across the 62 inju­
ries. A repeated-measures analysis of variance ("ANOVA") was then 
conducted to compare the severity judgments across the groups, using 
injury as the unit of analysis. 
TABLE 3: RATINGS OF OVERALLlNJURY SEVERITY 
Jurors 
Judges 
Plaintiffs' Lawyers 
Defense Lawyers 
Illinois 
3.64 
3.31 
3.52 
3.12 
New York 
3.63 
3.46 
3.42 
3.17 
Note: Each cell represents a mean taken over all 62 injuries. 
Ratings were made on a five-point scale, with 5 designated as "extremely severe." 
In each state, the four respondent groups differed in their assess­
ments of overall injury severity.108 For Illinois respondents, follow-up 
analyses showed that jurors rated the injuries as more severe than did 
judges109 and defense lawyers,110 but did not differ from plaintiffs' law­
yers. Plaintiffs' lawyers rated the injuries as more severe than did 
judges.111 Defense lawyers rated the injuries as less severe than did all 
other groups.112 For New York respondents, follow-up analyses 
showed that jurors rated the injuries as more severe than all other 
groups,113 and defense lawyers rated the injuries as less severe than all 
other groups.114 Plaintiffs' lawyers' severity ratings did not differ sig­
nificantly from judges' ratings. Thus, jurors tended to rate the injuries 
as more severe than the other groups, and defense lawyers rated them 
as less severe than the other groups. 
108. Illinois: F(3,183) = 14.78, p < .001; New York: F(3,183) = 11.70, p < .001. 
109. F(l,61) = 27.75, p < .001. 
110. F(l,61) = 34.02, p < .001. 
111. F(l,61) = 6.33,p < .05. 
112. Versus jurors: F(l,61) = 34.02, p < .001. Versus judges: F(l,61) = 5.12, p < .05. 
Versus plaintiffs' lawyers: F{l,61) = 16.66,p < .001. 
113. Versus judges: F(l,61) = 1.41,p < .01. Versus plaintiffs' lawyers: F(l,61) = 7.13, p 
< .05. Versus defense lawyers: F{l,61) = 30.88, p < .001. 
114. Versus judges: F(l,61) = 15.63,p < .OOL Versus plaintiffs' lawyers: F(l,61) = 6.88, 
p < .05. Versus jurors: F(l,61) = 30.88, p < .001. 
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To what extent did the different groups agree on which injuries 
were more severe and which less? Correlations were computed using 
the mean overall severity ratings calculated for each group, separately 
for each injury. Jurors' overall severity assessments were highly cor­
related with those of the other groups. In Illinois, the correlation of 
jurors' severity ratings with those of judges was r = .84; with those of 
plaintiffs' lawyers, r = .72; and with those of defense lawyers, r = .74.115 
In New York, the correlation of jurors' severity ratings with those of 
judges was r = .90; with those of plaintiffs' lawyers, r = .82; and with 
those of defense lawyers, r = .81.116 The intercorrelations of overall se­
verity ratings among judges, plaintiffs' lawyers, and defense lawyers 
ranged from .69 to .78 in Illinois and from .76 to .85 in New York. 
Thus, injuries seen as more severe by one group tended strongly to be 
seen as more severe by the other groups. 
2. Comparison of Awards 
Do the four different groups of decisionmakers, in the two differ­
ent states, vary in the damages awards they offer, such that some 
award more and others less for the same injury? To answer this ques­
tion, for each respondent group, the mean square-root award was cal­
culated for each injury, separately within each state. Table 4 presents 
these data, averaged across the 62 injuries. A repeated-measures 
ANOV A was conducted to compare the awards across the groups, 
with injury as the unit of analysis. 
TABLE 4: GENERAL DAMAGES AWARDS 
Illinois New York 
Jurors 665 746 
Judges 567 716 
Plaintiffs' I..a\V)'ers 780 817 
Defense I..a\V)'ers 561 659 
Note: Each cell represents a mean taken over all 62 injuries. 
The damage awards are square-root transformations of dollar distributions. 
In Illinois, awards differed by respondent group.117 Follow-up 
analyses showed that jurors' awards did not differ from those of plain­
tiffs' lawyers, but both gave awards that were larger than those of 
115. For each of the preceding correlations, n = 62 injuries and the significance level was 
p < .001. 
116. For each of the immediately preceding correlations, n = 62 injuries and the signifi­
cance level wasp < .001. 
117. F(3,183) = 155,p < .001. 
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judges118 and defense lawyers.119 Defense lawyers' awards did not dif­
fer significantly from judges' awards. In New York, awards differed 
marginally by respondent group.120 Follow-up analyses showed that 
jurors' awards were marginally larger than those of defense lawyers121 
and did not differ from those of judges and plaintiffs' lawyers. Plain­
tiffs' lawyers' awards were significantly larger than those of defense 
lawyers122 and marginally larger than those of judges.123 Defense law­
yers' awards were marginally smaller than judges' awards.124 Thus, in 
both states, plaintiffs' lawyers and jurors tended to give the largest 
awards, while defense lawyers tended to give the smallest awards. 
Given that jurors tended to rate the injuries as more severe than the 
other groups (and the defense lawyers rated them as least severe), and 
that the relationship between severity assessments and awards is 
strong, it would not be unreasonable for jurors' awards to be commen­
surately larger (and defense lawyers' awards smaller). 
To what extent did the different groups agree on which injuries de­
served higher general damages awards and which were entitled to 
lower awards? Correlations were computed using the mean square­
root award for each injury within each group, using injury as the unit 
of analysis. Jurors' awards were highly correlated with those of the 
other groups. In Illinois, the correlation of jurors' awards with judges' 
awards was r = .73; with plaintiffs' lawyers' awards, r = .63; and with 
defense lawyers' awards, r = .71.125 In New York, the correlation of ju­
rors' awards with judges' awards was r = .69; with plaintiffs' lawyers' 
awards, r = .60; and with defense lawyers' awards, r = .66.126 The inter­
correlations among the judges' and lawyers' awards ranged from .73 to 
.83 in Illinois and from .66 to .83 in New York. Thus, injuries that 
were given larger awards by one group also tended to be given larger 
awards by the other groups. 
118. Versus jurors: F(l,61) = 659, p < .05. Versus plaintiffs' lawyers: F(l,61) = 11.01, p 
< .01. 
119. Versus jurors: F(l,61) = 6.64, p < .05. Versus plaintiffs' lawyers, F(l,61) = 12.69, p 
<.01. 
120. F(3,183) = 256, p = .06. 
121. F(l,61) = 2.88,p = .095. 
122. F(l,61) = 5.14,p < .05. 
123. F(l,61) = 2.97,p = .09. 
124. F(l,61) = 2.88,p = .095. 
125. For each of the preceding correlations, n = 62 injuries and the significance level was 
p <  .001. 
126. For each of the inlmediately preceding correlations, n = 62 injuries and the signifi­
cance level wasp < .001. 
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3. Comparison of Each Group's Award with Its Prediction of the 
"Average Juror's" Award 
Do the four different groups of decisionmakers, in the two differ­
ent states, vary in their estimates of how much the "average juror" 
would award in general damages? Do some groups expect jurors to 
give awards that are more different from their own awards than other 
groups do? Are some groups' estimates of jurors' awards closer to the 
awards actually given by jurors in this study than other groups' esti­
mates? Respondents in each of the four groups were asked, after indi­
cating their own award, what they thought the "average juror" would 
award for the same injury. Each group's median award and median 
predicted "average juror" award were calculated for each injury, sepa­
rately within each state.127 Dependent-group t-tests then were con­
ducted. 
The estimated jurors' awards given by New York judges were 
larger than the awards they themselves gave,128 while those estimated 
by Illinois judges did not differ from their own awards. Defense law­
yers in Illinois129 and New York130 both gave estimated jurors' awards 
that were larger than the awards they themselves gave. Plaintiffs' law­
yers' awards did not differ from their predicted jurors' awards in either 
state. And jurors themselves gave estimated "average juror" awards 
that were larger than the awards they themselves gave.131 
Despite differences in the award amount predicted, all groups gave 
larger predicted jurors' awards to the injuries for which they them­
selves gave larger awards, and gave smaller predicted awards to the 
injuries for which they themselves gave smaller awards. In llinois, the 
correlations between each group's own awards and their predicted 
"average juror" awards were r = .91 for jurors, r = .49 for judges, r = 
.82 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and r = .93 for defense lawyers.132 In New 
York, the correlations between each group's own awards and their 
predicted "average juror" awards were r = .88 for jurors, r = .95 for 
judges, r = .96 for plaintiffs' lawyers, and r = .89 for defense Iawyers.133 
Thus, all groups expect jurors' vertical equity to be quite similar to 
their own. 
127. Because the data for this group of analyses consisted of raw damages estimates, 
medians were used to reduce the influence of outliers. 
128. t(61) = 3.60, p < .01. 
129. t(61) = 3.32, p < .01. 
130. t(61) = 2.67, p < .05. 
131. Illinois jurors: t(61) = 3.17, p < .01. New York jurors: t{61) = 3.60, p < .01. 
132. For each of the preceding correlations, n = 62 injuries and the significance level was 
p < .001. 
133. For each of the immediately preceding correlations, n = 62 injuries and the signifi­
cance level wasp < .001. 
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How well could judges and lawyers predict what awards jurors 
would give? Within each state, we compared judges' and lawyers' 
"average juror" awards with the actual awards given by the jurors in 
our study. In Illinois, the awards actually given by jurors were smaller 
than what plaintiffs' lawyers134 and defense lawyers135 predicted they 
would be, but did not differ from the judges' predictions. In New 
York, the awards given by jurors were smaller than what judges136 and 
defense lawyers137 predicted they would be, but did not differ from the 
plaintiffs' lawyers' predictions. Generally, then, the awards jurors ac­
tually gave tended to be smaller than the awards judges and lawyers 
predicted they would give. 
Correlations between jurors' actual awards and the awards pre­
dicted for them by judges and lawyers tell us how well those legal pro­
fessionals could anticipate which injuries would evoke larger and 
which would evoke smaller awards from jurors; that is, the extent to 
which judges and lawyers could predict the vertical variation in jurors' 
responses to injuries. These correlations varied considerably. In 
Illinois, the correlations between jurors' actual awards and the awards 
predicted for them by both plaintiffs' lawyers138 and defense lawyers139 
were significant, while the correlation with the awards predicted by 
judges was only marginally significant.140 In New York, the correla­
tions between jurors' actual awards and the awards predicted by 
judges141 and defense lawyers142 were significant, but the correlation 
with plaintiffs' lawyers' predicted awards was not.143 The range in · 
these correlations (from .21 to .78) is striking, especially considering 
that it is plaintiffs' lawyers who do both best (in Illinois) and worst (in 
New York) at anticipating the vertical variation in jurors' reactions to 
the injuries. 
D. The Stabilizing Power of Aggregation into Groups 
Thus far, we have been speaking as though jurors made decisions 
individually, as judges do in bench trials, rather than in groups, as ju­
ries. The greater observed variability in the awards of jurors, as com-
134. t(61) =2.19,p < .05. 
135. t(61) = 2.45, p < .05. 
136. t(61) = 2.10, p < .05. 
137. t(61) =2.49,p < .05. 
138. r(60) = .78,p < .001. 
139. r(60) = .37,p < .01. 
140. r(60) = .24, p = .06. 
141. r(60) = .46,p < .001. 
142 r(60) = .41,p < .001. 
143. r(60) = .21, p = .10. 
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pared to those of judges and lawyers, would decrease if the individuals 
were combined into juries, as they are in actual trials. That group de­
cisions decrease in variability (and increase in predictability) com­
pared to the decisions of the individuals who compose the groups, is to 
be expected both from basic statistical144 and social psychological145 
properties of groups. In addition, studies that have tested this ques­
tion directly using mock jurors and juries have found that, for the 
same case, awards of deliberating juries are less variable than awards 
of jurors deciding damages as individuals.146 Thus, the data we have 
presented to this point, on individuals, overstates the variability.147 
Our final set of analyses is essentially (and merely) a demonstra­
tion of the phenomenon that when individuals decide as groups their 
144. Larger samples produce distributions with smaller standard errors than smaller 
samples. For example, a set of samples of size 6 or 12 as compared to samples of size 1. 
145. People in decisionmaking groups tend to coalesce toward a consensus; their shifts 
tend to be toward, rather than away from, each other. This is a basic aspect of group be­
havior, which has long been observed. See, e.g., A. PAUL HARE, HANDBOOK OF SMALL 
GROUP REsEARCH 19 {1976) (groups tend to establish norms which are viewed as legitimate 
by group members); MUZAFIR SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS 104 {1936) 
(people in social interaction gravitate toward sharing the perceptions and judgments of those 
with whom they interact). 
146. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: 
Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAULL. REV. 301, 316 tbl. IV 
{1998) {finding the standard deviation of their individual jurors' general damages awards to 
be $4,255,056 compared to $714,556 for decisions on the same case facts by deliberating ju­
ries); Shari S. Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, UNDERSTANDING JURIES (forthcoming) 
(using data from a completely different set of jurors and a completely different case and 
finding the standard deviation of jurors' awards to be $175,988 and of juries' awards to be 
$122,749). 
147. The only suggestion to the contrary of which we are aware appears in Sunstein et 
al., supra note 51. They allude to the familiar notion that larger groups (such as juries) show 
less variability than smaller groups or individuals. But they also argue that there exists an 
"amplification of bias" by which group deliberation would produce greater variance than 
was found in their study of individual mock jurors. See id. at 2101 n.128. This argument con­
fuses several principles upon which it relies. Sunstein et al. are correct that group delibera­
tion produces group polarization, a post-deliberation shift toward positions more extreme 
than the prediscussion central tendency of the individuals. See, e.g., Martin F. Kaplan, Dis­
cussion Polarization Effects in a Modified Jury Decision Paradigm: Informational Influ­
ences, 40 SOCIOMETRY 262 (1977); Serge Moscovici & Marisa Zavalloni, The Group as a 
Polarizer of Attitudes, 12 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 125 (1969); David G. Myers & 
Helmut Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83 PSYCHOL. BULL. 602 (1976). But 
they overlook the fact that groups tend to coalesce around that more extreme position. 
Thus, in a given case, groups will be more consistent than individuals at the same time that 
they will be more extreme (in whichever direction). When Sunstein et al. jump from the 
phenomenon of deliberation-induced shifts to the conclusion of "even greater variance," 
Sunstein et al., supra note 51, at 2101 n.128, they have jumped from thinking about the vari­
ance for a given case to the variance of the mass of cases. That is, some types of cases \viii 
shift one way and some the other way, resulting in greater variance across a set of different 
cases. But that phenomenon is irrelevant to the policy issue of variability among like cases. 
The unwanted variability in cases is not that different cases receive different awards (vertical 
equity requires that they do), but that any given case would receive different awards from 
different decisionmakers (that would be horizontal inequity). The available evidence sup­
ports the conclusion that variance declines when we move from jurors to juries. See supra 
note 146. 
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decisions are more consistent and predictable .than when they decide 
the same question as individuals. These analyses were conducted on 
only the first of the two injuries evaluated by each of our respondents; 
that is, all 62 injuries were included, but only the data of those that 
were the first of the pair a respondent heard. 
Treating each decision by a judge as if it were a decision in a bench 
trial, we calculated the standard deviation of those raw general dam­
ages awards. This is analogous to calculating the standard deviation 
for a set of awards from a sample of bench trials in a jurisdiction. 
When considering the same set of injuries, the standard deviation of 
awards made by Illinois judges was approximately 2.3 million and by 
New York judges about 1.5 million. Doing the same analysis for indi­
vidual jurors, as if they decided cases individually as judges do, we find 
much greater variability in response to the same set of injuries. The 
standard deviation for Illinois jurors was about 10.0 million, and for 
New York jurors about 16.6 million. 
To estimate the awards that would be made if individual jurors had 
been grouped into juries and asked to decide awards as a group, we 
created statistical groups by taking the median148 of the raw awards of 
all jurors who evaluated the same injury, for each of the 62 injuries, 
separately within each state. In this way we made "juries" of 4 or 5 
persons each. Although the mix of injuries is as varied as in either of 
the preceding analyses, the standard deviation shrinks considerably: 
to about 755,000 for Illinois "juries" and about 543,000 for New York 
"juries." Thus, the awards of juries were less varied than those of 
judges.149 
These analyses do not purport to give the actual standard deviation 
that would be obtained by combining the actual individuals into 
groups and having them reach consensus in group deliberation. These 
analyses merely illustrate the phenomenon and its general tendencies, 
namely, that groups produce more stable and more predictable esti­
mates than individuals.15° Considering that there were few extreme 
148. The median of individual judgments provides a very good estimate of the group 
judgment. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to 
Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 L. & SOC'Y REV. 513, 545 
tbl. 4 (1992), which found that using medians of individual pre-deliberation judgments to 
estimate group decisions correlated .62 with the decisions of deliberating juries composed of 
those same individuals. By contrast, other plausible methods of statistically estimating the 
group decision had lower, sometimes much lower, correlations. 
149. A better test of this, but a far more expensive one, would have jurors deliberate as 
groups, and would treat those group judgments as the ones to be modeled and compared to 
those of judges and lawyers. 
150. Moreover, larger groups do so to a greater extent than smaller groups. See Michael 
J. Saks, The Smaller the Jury, the Greater the Unpredictability, 79 JUDICATURE 263 (1996); 
see also Michael J. Saks & Mollie Weighner Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury 
Size, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHA v. 451, 463-64 (1997). 
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outliers to begin with,151 it is easy to see how a juror recommending an 
extreme award could be outnumbered and reined in by the majority of 
jurors preferring more moderate awards. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This concluding Part will begin by summarizing the study's findings 
(Sections A through C). Section D will consider the implications of 
the findings for legal policy concerning the determination of general 
damages by juries. Section E will raise further empirical research 
questions that remain to be asked and answered. 
A Perceptions of Injury Severity 
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the analyses ex­
amining the different decisionmakers' judgments of the overall sever­
ity of the injuries. 
First, the regression models suggest that different decisionmakers 
- people with different roles in the legal system, different experience 
with personal injury cases, and different demographic backgrounds -
relied on the same injury attributes in similar ways and gave them 
similar relative weight when evaluating the severity of injuries.152 For 
all groups, the extent of perceived disability and mental suffering were 
the strongest predictors of overall severity judgments, with disfigure­
ment and pain making smaller contributions.153 The only notable de­
parture from the pattern was the model for defense lawyers, for whom 
mental suffering had the most powerful influence (whereas for the 
other three groups it was disability) and pain did not have a significant 
unique influence. Nevertheless, all of the regression models ac­
counted for a large, and similar, proportion of variance in the deci­
sionmakers' judgments of overall severity: 69% for judges, 72 % for 
jurors,154 75% for defense lawyers, and 78% for plaintiff's lawyers. 
Second, all four groups of decisionmakers had generally similar 
perceptions of what injuries are of relatively greater or lesser severity. 
Shared vertical equity is evident from the finding that jurors' overall 
severity assessments were highly correlated with those of the other 
groups, ranging from .72 to .84 in Illinois and from .81 to .90 in New 
151. See the Measures section, supra Section III.E.l, for a discussion of how we identi· 
fied extreme outliers. They constituted 232% of the jurors' awards. For comparison, ex· 
treme outliers constituted 1.03% of judges' and 1.21 % oflawyers' awards. 
152 See Table 1. 
153. A similar pattern was seen in the two studies in Wissler et al., supra note 27. 
154. Similarly, in the two studies in Wissler et al., supra note 27, at 189, 200, under· 
graduates' injury perceptions accounted for 75% and 89%, respectively, of the variance in 
their overall severity assessments. 
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York. Jurors tended to assess injuries as being more severe than the 
other groups did, while defense lawyers tended, even more strongly, to 
see injuries as less severe than the other groups did. Nonetheless, in­
juries seen as more severe by one group tended strongly to be seen as 
more severe by the other groups. 
The remarkable similarity across the varied decisionmakers' re­
sponse patterns when judging the severity of injuries has important 
implications. The findings suggest that jurors approach the task of 
evaluating injuries no differently than judges and lawyers do. Thus, 
assertions that jurors cannot intelligently evaluate injuries or have 
idiosyncratic reactions to injuries are simply incorrect, or at least ill­
focused. Indeed, if any one group emerges as being out of step with 
all of the others, it is defense lawyers. This has somewhat paradoxical 
implications. When members of the defense bar evaluate the per­
formance of jurors, and gauge them to be off the mark,155 these law­
yers no doubt reach that assessment by comparing the jurors' conclu­
sions to their own. But their own impressions of injuries are the ones 
that depart most from the pattern shared by the other decisionmaking 
groups, at least in regard to judgments of injury severity. 
Third, for all groups, while the core attributes of injuries accounted 
for the lion's share of variance in severity judgments, the sociodemo­
graphic variables played essentially no role. Because a finding that the 
background characteristics of the decisionmakers have little or no im­
pact on their decisions may surprise readers unacquainted with the 
relevant literature, it may be worth mentioning that this merely ex­
tends a finding now well established elsewhere in the jury decision­
making literature. Though most of that research has been on criminal 
trials, juror sociodemographic characteristics also have been found to 
play only a modest role in their civil liability verdicts,156 certainly com­
pared to the dominant impact of evidence and arguments presented in 
the cases. The present study, along with other recent research, sug­
gests that what had been learned about liability verdicts can be ex­
tended to damages-relevant responses: individual differences make 
little diff erence.157 
155. For example, James Griffith, an attorney specializing in medical malpractice de­
fense, wrote, "There's no limit on what jurors can award for pain and suffering, so too often 
they act like Santa Claus, handing out millions of dollars in cases involving comparatively 
minor injuries." James Griffith, What it Will Take to Solve the Malpractice Crisis, MED. 
ECON. Sept. 27, 1982, at 195. 
156. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social Scientists Know 
and Do Not Know, 73 JUDICATURE 178, 180 (1990); Steven D. Penrod, Predictors of Jury 
Decision-making in Criminal and Civil Cases: A Field Experiment, 3 FORENSIC REP. 261 
(1990); Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) 
Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. lNTERDISC. LJ. 1, 9-13 (1998). 
157. See Diamond et al., supra note 146, at 314 (finding, in a study that used a video­
taped presentation of a highly realistic simulated trial to 1042 mock jurors from Cook 
County, Illinois, that "[o]ur attempt to trace the sources of this variation [in damages 
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B. General Damages Awards 
The picture becomes somewhat blurred when the transition is 
made from perceptions of the overall severity of injuries to placing 
dollar values on them. First, for awards, the regression models for the 
different groups of decisionmakers differed more from each other in 
terms of the factors that account for awards as well as the relative in­
fluence of the core injury attributes and the sociodemographic charac­
teristics.158 Second, the model for each group of decisionmakers ac­
counted for a smaller proportion of the variance in awards than in 
severity assessments. 
While similarities were found, different respondent groups gave 
differing weight to the various injury attributes when awarding dam­
ages. Defense lawyers differed from all other groups in that for them 
mental suffering weighed more heavily than disability. And plaintiffs' 
lawyers differed from all other groups in that for them disfigurement 
did not have a significant impact on awards. Thus, the impact of the 
injury attributes on jurors' awards more closely resembled their im­
pact on judges' awards, and their impact on the lawyers' awards di­
verged from both judges and jurors. Nonetheless, there were impor­
tant similarities among the decisionmakers regarding which injury 
attributes were predictive of their general damages awards. For all re­
spondent groups, perceived pain was related to awards only indirectly 
through its association with the other injury attributes, while greater 
perceived disability and mental suffering were strongly associated with 
larger awards.159 
Compared to the models of severity assessments, sociodemo­
graphic characteristics played a larger role in awards, both directly and 
through their interaction with other factors. For jurors, gender and 
income were predictive in both states. Men and wealthier jurors 
awarded more than women and poorer jurors. One explanation for 
these findings might be that in a task as undefined as awarding general 
damages, people rely on the only reference scale with which they are 
familiar, namely their own. Those who are accustomed to dealing in 
larger amounts fit the cases onto a mental reference scale that runs 
into higher numbers. This would explain not only the finding that 
wealthier individuals give higher awards, but also that on average men 
give higher awards than women. Another explanation might be more 
cultural: that something in their value system leads people of higher 
awards] to individual differences in the background and attitude of jurors met with little suc­
cess"); see also id. at 307 tbl. I. 
158. See Table 2. 
159. For jurors and lawyers, some of the main effects of the injury attributes are quali­
fied by interactions. See the Results Section, supra Section IV.B, for the details. 
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socioeconomic status to place a higher monetary value on personal 
injuries and their sequella. 
In contrast to jurors, the significant demographic variable for 
judges and lawyers in this study was state. Generally, judges and law­
yers in New York gave larger awards than those in Illinois. Several 
explanations are possible. For the same reasons that wealthier jurors 
gave larger awards, it may be that wealthier lawyers and judges (i.e., 
the ones in New York) give larger awards. Another possible explana­
tion is the differences between the two states in the laws regarding 
damages awards. In New York, loss of enjoyment of life is considered 
a distinct element of damages, but in Illinois it is subsumed as part of 
mental suffering. This would be expected to lead to higher awards by 
New York judges and lawyers. Though all respondents were read the 
instructions based on those in their state, the same effect might not 
have arisen for jurors because they are less likely to be attuned to the 
finer details in the instructions than are lawyers and judges (indeed, 
most of the lawyers and judges presumably already know their respec­
tive state's rules).160 Yet another explanation might be that the judges 
and lawyers in each state know that theirs is thought to be a relatively 
low or high award jurisdiction and act in accord with those expecta­
tions, while jurors do not know that they are "supposed" to give 
higher awards if they are in New York and lower awards if they are in 
Illinois. 
Nonetheless, the paucity of relationships between most of the 
demographic variables and awards (collectively accounting for only 
1 % to 4 % of the variance in awards) is the more important part of the 
story.161 Several of these non-differences are especially worthy of 
note. Illinois jurors did not give awards that differed from those of 
New York jurors. And the awards of jurors living in rural areas did 
not differ from those of jurors living in urban areas.162 These non­
differences contrast with findings of archival studies, which suggested 
that, on a national spectrum, New York jurors give relatively high 
awards while Illinois jurors give relatively low awards,163 and that ur-
160. Instructions are often difficult for jurors to understand. See Michael J. Saks, Judi­
cial Nullification, 68 IND. LJ. 1281, 1282-83 (1993). 
161. As noted previously, research has found little relationship between jurors' socio­
demographic attributes and the verdicts of the jurors or the juries on which they sit. See su­
pra notes 156-157 and accompanying text. 
162. Although rural or urban locale did not affect the size of awards, it did interact with 
perceived disfigurement such that disfigurement had a significant impact on the awards of 
urban jurors but not rural jurors. 
163. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 12, at 69-90. A possible explanation for the 
differences observed by Daniels and Martin is that their data were based on total awards, 
and interstate differences in medical expenses, earnings, and the cost of living could account 
for differences in awards. 
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ban jurors award more than rural jurors.164 Those archival studies 
could not control for the kinds of cases that jurors in the different lo­
cales were deciding because they had no data on the nature of the 
cases themselves, so they could not determine whether observed dif­
ferences were due to differences in the tendencies of the jurors or to 
differences in the cases being presented to those jurors. Because the 
current study presented an identical set of cases to jurors in the two 
regions of the two states, our findings suggest that the differences ob­
served in those other studies were due not to differences in the jurors 
but to differences in the mix of cases that came to trial in the different 
locales.165 
In addition to differences in the components of the models, awards 
were less predictable than were severity assessments. The regression 
model for each group, especially for jurors, accounted for a smaller 
proportion of the variance in awards: 23% for jurors, 42% for judges, 
48% for plaintiffs' lawyers, and 58% for defense lawyers.166 The lack 
of information about the plaintiff's gender and pre-injury lifestyle 
might have contributed to the variability in awards for all groups. The 
jurors' lack of experience in assigning a dollar value seems an obvious 
explanation for the greater variability and lower predictability of ju­
rors' awards. 
164. See DANZON, supra note 33, at 63, 74-75. A possible explanation for the differ­
ences observed by Danzon is that her data could reflect differences in medical expenses, 
earnings, and the cost of living in urban versus rural areas. 
165. Another difference is that Danzon's research used states as the unit of analysis, 
rather than individuals or juries. Inferences drawn about relationships at the state level may 
or may not hold at smaller levels of aggregation. This problem is known as the "ecological 
fallacy." Thus, while Danzon found that urban areas (actually, relatively more urban states) 
experienced larger awards than more rural areas (actually, relatively more rural states), 
there is no reason to expect her findings to apply to urban versus rural areas within states, or 
to people from urban versus rural areas. 
166. It is worth noting that the proportions of variance in awards accounted for by the 
present data are lower than those of other studies cited in our Introduction. This difference 
may suggest an important cognitive insight. Our study had respondents rating each injury 
without comparison to others, or in comparison with one other injury (when rating the sec­
ond in the pair). Most of the other studies had respondents or coders rating larger numbers 
of injuries. No doubt if we had people rank order our 62 cases and then used that as a pre­
dictor of awards, the correlation would rise considerably. In our own studies of damages, all 
using similar procedures, when each respondent evaluated 12 or 13 cases, the R2 = .74. See 
Wissler et al., supra note 27, at 201. When each respondent evaluated 5 cases, the R2 = .54. 
See id. at 195. And in the present study, where each juror evaluated 2 cases (so half the time 
were evaluating the first of the pair), the R2= .23. If this insight is correct, the higher propor­
tions of variance accounted for in the models of judges and lawyers reflect their having (in 
their heads, from the numerous other cases they have known) a more complete cognitive 
reference scale of injuries to provide a context for thinking about the case now under con­
sideration. That, in turn, suggests a relatively simple and yet potentially powerful reform -
providing jurors with a frame of reference for determining the appropriate general damages 
award - that should produce considerable improvement in the predictability and stability of 
jurors' awards of general damages. The issue of providing jurors with such guidance is dis­
cussed below. 
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The decreased predictability of jurors' awards might also be ex­
plained by the difference in education, income, and gender between 
jurors (as a group) compared to judges and lawyers.167 When looking 
only at those subgroups of jurors who most closely approximate judges 
and lawyers on these dimensions, we find the greatest predictability of 
awards compared to those jurors who are least similar. For jurors with 
post-college study or an advanced degree, the full regression model 
accounted for 29% of the variance in awards, with progressively lesser 
amounts of variance accounted for as the level of education declined, 
culminating in a model that accounted for 14% of the variance in 
awards for jurors who had not graduated from high school. For jurors 
with household incomes over $75,000, the model accounted for 32% of 
the variance in awards, with progressively lesser amounts of variance 
accounted for as the level of income declined, culminating in a model 
that accounted for 20% of the variance in awards for jurors with in­
comes below $15,000. And for male jurors, the model accounted for 
27% of the variance in awards, compared to 15% for women jurors. 
Thus, to some extent, the differences in the predictability of jurors' 
awards, compared to those of judges and lawyers, is a product of social 
differences and not simply differences in the extent of experience in 
awarding general damages for injuries. 
Given the small variability in assessments of injury severity within 
each respondent group and the strong relationship between overall se­
verity assessments and awards, the variability in awards would seem to 
be due largely to differences in the metrics people use to convert per­
ceptions of injury severity into awards.168 Why didn't we find more 
variability in the severity ratings instead of only in the dollar awards? 
Perhaps the five-point severity rating scale limits the expression of 
one's evaluation of injuries or consideration of subtle distinctions 
among them, compared to the more fine-grained and unbounded na­
ture of dollar scales. Thus, the lack of variability in severity ratings 
might be due to the insufficiency of the rating scale producing an ap­
parent consistency in judgments rather than to a truly better quality of 
decisionmaking. 
Despite the lesser predictability of awards, the correlations be­
tween severity ratings and awards (using the injury scenarios as the 
unit of analysis) showed a strong association between the degree of 
perceived injury severity and the size of the awards given. These cor­
relations were .83 for jurors, .88 for judges, .77 for plaintiffs' lawyers, 
and .88 for defense lawyers. This finding replicates the high degree of 
vertical equity in awards found in other studies.169 In addition, shared 
167. See supra Section III.C. 
168. See related discussions in Sunstein et al., supra note 51, at 2106-07, and Wissler et 
al., supra note 27, at 193. 
169. See studies cited supra notes 26-27. 
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vertical equity is evident from the finding that jurors' damages awards 
were well correlated with those of the other groups, ranging from .63 
to .73 in Illinois and from .60 to .69 in New York.170 These findings in­
dicate that all groups tended to agree on which injuries deserved 
higher general damages awards and which deserved smaller ones. 
Even an examination of the absolute level of awards, however, 
does not find jurors to be out of line. Averaged over all cases, jurors 
and plaintiffs' lawyers tended to give the highest awards, defense law­
yers the lowest, and judges gave an intermediate amount.171 What 
might account for the higher awards given by jurors? One obvious 
"statistical" explanation is that the greater variability of individual ju­
rors' awards allows the average to shift upward more readily than 
downward. A second, "vertical equity," explanation is that it is ap­
propriate that the jurors' awards would be larger than those of other 
groups because jurors rated the injuries as more severe. A third pos­
sible explanation is an artifact of the media's reporting of jury awards, 
which tends to cover higher award amounts.172 While lawyers and 
judges would be aware that there are many small awards that are not 
reported for every large verdict that is reported, jurors are less likely 
to know that, and their frames of reference would be affected accord­
ingly. A final possible explanation is an artifact of our interview pro­
cedures. By asking judges and lawyers, but not jurors, in both states to 
make what they regarded as appropriate awards, regardless of any 
caps in effect in their states, we were unavoidably reminding them of 
caps, which might have artificially pushed down their awards. 
In sum, the way in which the damages decisionmaking models of 
jurors differ most from those of judges and lawyers is in their variabil­
ity, not in the patterns of the factors that affect their awards. And this 
variability among jurors is almost certain to decline when the deci­
sionmakers consist of juries.113 This study was not able to do more 
than demonstrate that general effect: the awards of (statistically cre­
ated) juries were less varied than those of judges, while the awards of 
jurors were far more varied than those of judges. 
170. The findings of Vidmar & Rice, supra note 18 - that jurors and arbitrators have 
similar patterns of correlations of perceptions of disfigurement, etc., with awards - parallel 
our own. In both states, our findings showed the lowest correlation was between jurors and 
plaintiffs' lawyers, suggesting an interesting area of further study. 
171. See Table 4. 
172 See Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Me­
dia as Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 419, 421, 426 (1996) ("It is a small step to assert that reading about million­
dollar verdicts might lead people to overestimate the frequency of large jury awards."); see 
also Michael J. Saks, Public Opinion About the Civil Jury: Can Reality be Found in the Illu­
sions?, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 221, 231-34 (1998). 
173. See discussion supra notes 144-151 and accompanying text. 
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C. Judges' and Lawyers' Predictions of the Awards 
of the "Average Juror" 
811 
When asked to predict the awards that would be made by the "av:. 
erage juror," judges in New York, defense lawyers in both states, and 
the jurors themselves, predicted that the average juror would give 
awards that were larger than they themselves would give in the same 
case. Apparently, the members of most groups, with plaintiffs' law­
yers being the unsurprising exception, think that the awards they per­
sonally would give are lower than those given by jurors. Despite these 
differences in the predicted awards, judges and lawyers expected ju­
rors to share their relative assessments of damages - giving larger 
awards in the cases where they themselves gave larger awards, and 
smaller awards in the cases where they themselves gave smaller 
awards.174 Thus, all groups expected the average juror's awards to 
have vertical equity that strongly paralleled their own, but to he 
shifted upward. 
The awards our jurors actually gave tended to be smaller than the 
awards the judges and lawyers predicted they would give. One might 
expect the expertise of judges and lawyers to include accurate predic­
tions of what jurors will do. We would be hesitant to make too much 
of this systematic bias ( overprediction), except that it is consistent with 
findings where lawyers have been asked to estimate the size of jury 
awards in their states.175 Systematic errors call for explanations; we 
can only speculate on one. A generations-old legal folklore about tbe 
excesses of civil jurors, compounded by the public rhetoric of more re­
cent years, may prevent lawyers from recognizing what jurors actually 
do. Even without such folklore, or perhaps at the root of it, the 
"availability heuristic" might be operating176 - a cognitive bias which 
suggests that judges and lawyers will have a tendency to more easily 
recall surprisingly large awards, and then to estimate the overall be­
havior of juries from those more "available," but less representative, 
instances.177 
174. The correlations between the lawyers' and judges' own awards and the awards they 
predicted the "average juror" would give ranged from .49 to .93 in Illinois and from .89 to .96 
in New York. 
175. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South Carolina: The Effect of Empiri­
cal Research on Elite Perceptions Concerning Jury Verdicts, 39 S.C. L. REV. 585 (1988). 
176. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Fre­
quency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. '2JJ7 (1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
177. The correlations between what judges and lawyers predicted the average juror 
would award and what our jurors in fact awarded present an odd pattern, with some of the 
most wide-ranging correlations found in the entire study. Plaintiffs' lawyers do both the best 
(in Illinois, r = .78) and the worst (in New York, r = .21) job of predicting our jurors' awards 
in the cases. Perhaps the lack of a real pattern is the most one can say about these correla­
tions. 
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D. Policy Implications 
The dominant theme of these findings is one of considerable siini­
larity across the various groups of decisionmakers in the structure of 
thinking about injury severity and awards. Most importantly, an im­
pressive similarity exists in the injury attributes that drive their deci­
sions, the weight given to those attributes, and the shared sense of ver­
tical equity held by jurors, judges, plaintiffs' lawyers, and defense 
lawyers alike. These findings suggest that commonly voiced specula­
tions about the inability or irrationality of jurors in evaluating injuries 
are misconceived, because on that task jurors were nearly indistin­
guishable from judges and lawyers. These data also reveal, contrary to 
some discussions in the literature, no differences between jurors in two 
different states and in different regions of the same state when they 
are asked to respond to the same set of injuries. 
If there is any basis for concern, it is the translation from percep­
tions of injuries into dollar valuations. But that is a problem not with 
jurors alone, but with the task - judges and lawyers similarly display 
decreased predictability, albeit a smaller decrease, as they move from 
severity assessment to damages valuation, and reveal more between­
group differences in the models that predict their decisions. Thus, im­
provements, if justified as desirable policy, should be concerned less 
with who is to make the decisions about general damages and more 
with making the task more achievable. 
1. Whether the Role of the Jury Should Be Reduced 
Should the role of the jury in making general damages awards be 
reduced or eliminated? Should the determination of those awards, as 
others have suggested in the context of punitive damages, be trans­
ferred from jurors to judges?178 The main argument for doing this is 
that judges would produce more predictable awards than juries.179 
178. See Sunstein et al., supra note 51, at 2112-13 ("It would be reasonable to react to 
our study by suggesting a simple reform: Juries should decide questions of civil liability, just 
as they do questions of criminal liability. But judges should decide on the appropriate level 
of punitive damages, just as they do criminal punishment, subject, in both cases, to guidelines 
laid down in advance."). Sunstein et al. presented 28 variations of 10 case vignettes to 899 
randomly selected registered voters in Travis County, Texas, and asked them to (a) evaluate 
the cases, and (b) recommend punitive damages awards to assess against the defendants in 
those cases. Id. at 2095. Sunstein et al. found that jurors were breathtakingly consistent in 
their judgments of the defendant's outrageousness (r = .99), but that variability increased 
(reliability and predictability decreased) in the second step, namely translating those judg­
ments into punitive awards (r = .42). Id. at 2098, 2103. Sunstein et al. conclude that "indi­
vidual differences in dollar awards produce severe unpredictability and highly erratic out­
comes," id. at 2103, and implicitly assume, without any data, that judges would make very 
different decisions than jurors do, id. at 2113. 
179. Perhaps it goes without saying that predictability and consistency might be pur­
chased at the cost of more important values. For example, the rule of thumb some lawyers 
use to come up with a figure for general damages for purposes of settlement negotiation -
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First of all, it is not clear from the empirical evidence that transfer­
ring the task from juries to judges would increase predictability at all, 
much less to the satisfaction of those calling for such a reform. Our 
findings show a fairly high correlation between awards given by judges 
and those given by individual jurors (r's = .73 and .69 in the two states 
respectively).180 Based on the decision models we developed, the pre­
dictability of jurors' general damages awards, expressed as a correla­
tion, is r = .48, while that of judges is .65.181 That suggests that judges 
also are far from perfect. And jurors, as well as judges, perform this 
task at a level of reliability that compares favorably to that of other 
important societal decisionmaking. As Table 5 indicates, juror evalua­
tions of injury severity and damages are of comparable consistency 
and predictability to the decisions of a considerable array of other de­
cisionmakers who are thought to be far more expert and who are per­
forming tasks thought to be much better defined than that of assessing 
general damages. 
multiplying medical specials by three - would, if adopted as a legal rule for assigning dam­
ages, produce highly predictable outcomes, but at the expense of injury- and victim-specific 
considerations. Sometimes the amount awarded would be too great and sometimes it would 
be too small. 
It may be worth noting that some level of variability is beneficial to the legal process. 
The proper level of uncertainty helps to promote settlements, while not promoting so many 
that courts do not receive the cases necessary to monitor society's disputes, and thereby to 
continually refine and announce the law. For more detailed discussion of this point, see 
Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 243 (1988). A rational goal would be to aim to calibrate the level of uncertainty to 
seek its optimal level, rather than to aim to eliminate uncertainty from the litigation system. 
180. Thus, we found higher reliability in awards (in terms of agreement between judges 
and jurors) than Sunstein et al. did (in terms of agreement among jurors). Perhaps this re­
flects differences in the challenge of assigning dollar values for general damages versus for 
punitive damages. If so, it implies that Sunstein et al.'s speculation that their findings would 
generalize to other juror decision tasks about damages is unwarranted. Sunstein et al., supra 
note 51, at 2131-38. 
181. Taking the square root of the R-squareds in Tables 2A and 2B, for jurors and 
judges, respectively. 
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TABLE 5: RELIABILITY OF VARIOUS DECISIONMAKERS MAKING 
VARIOUS DECISIONS 
Decisionmakers and Tasks 
Jurors evaluating outrageousness of tortious conduct 
(reliability)a 
Jurors and Judges evaluating injury severity (reliability) (in 
IL & NY, respectively)b 
Jurors evaluating injury severity (predictive validity)b 
Judges evaluating injury severity (predictive validity)b 
Jurors and Judges deciding amount of general damages 
(reliability) (in IL & NY, respectively)b 
Judges deciding general damages (predictive validity)b 
Juries and Judges deciding on personal injury liability 
(reliability )c 
Federal judges deciding criminal sentences (reliability)d 
Four different kinds of business experts rating strategic 
attributes associated with competitive moves in 15 different 
companies (reliability)e 
Scientists deciding merits of research proposals (reliability)c 
Jurors deciding general damages (predictive validity)b 
Doctors diagnosing skin diseases (reliability) {three different 
diseases)g 
Jurors deciding punitive damages (reliability)a 
Employment interviewers deciding on qualifications for 
hiring (reliability)h 
Navy pilots rating technical effectiveness of aircraft 
(reliability) {three different sets of measures)i 
Psychiatric diagnoses (reliability)i 
Strength of 
Association 
.99 
.84, .90 
.85 
.83 
.73, .69 
.65 
.58 
.58 
.55, .55, .50, 
.47 
.so 
.48 
.36, .48, .48 
.42 
.40 
.28, .12, .16 
.13, .22 
Note: Pearson correlations or multiple correlations are in bold; Cohen kappas are in regular 
font. In a few instances, the tabled correlation values had to be calculated from rates of 
agreement given in the original sources. 
The data in the table are taken from the following studies: 
a. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and 
Valuation in Law), 107 YALEL.J. 2071 (1998). 
b. The study reported in this Article. 
c. Henry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964). 
d. Shari S. Diamond & Hans Zeise!, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity 
and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (1975). 
e. Ming-Jer Chen et al., An Exploration of the Expertness of Outside lnfonnants, 36 
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT J. 1614 (1993). 
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f. S. Cole et al., Chance and Consensus in Peer Review, 214 SCIENCE 881 (1981). 
g. John D. Whited et al., Primary Care Clinicians' Performance for Detecting Actinic 
Keratoses and Skin Cancer, 157 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 985 (1997). 
h. R.S. Uhrbrock, The Personnel Interview, 1 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 273 (1948). 
i. Leonard Adelman & Michael L. Donnell, An Empirical Study Comparing Pilots' In­
terrater Reliability Ratings for Workload and Effectiveness, 18 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON 
SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS 978 (1988). 
j. Pierre Leichner et al., A Study of the Reliability of the Clinical Oral Examination in 
Psychiatry, 29 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 394 (1984). 
Moreover, there is good reason to believe that juries (groups) pro­
duce considerably more stable and predictable outcomes compared to 
jurors (individuals).182 Consequently, decisions of juries may ap­
proach, or even exceed, the stability and predictability of decisions of 
individual judges. Without persuasive data to the contrary, entertain­
mg a reform that would reduce or eliminate the role of juries in malc­
ing damages awards seems premature. 
But assuming that, at the end of the day, it ·is concluded that a 
marginal advantage in the predictability of general damages awards 
favoring judges does exist, is the transfer of responsibility from juries 
to judges wise policy? The answer lies in weighing this small gain in 
predictability against what would be lost. 
A core benefit of juries is the sampling function they provide. The 
law apparently has discovered that the best substitute for a market to 
generate the values of the sorts of losses subsµmed under gener� 
damages is to sample the judgment of the community. Moreover, if it 
is to tailor damages to the actual losses incurred, it must do its sam­
pling on a case-by-case basis. To accomplish these functions, jUries 
not only are quite an efficient method, they are the only available 
method. Without juries, the ability to estimate the community's sense 
of the value of the ability to see or to hear or to walk or to have chil­
dren or to be a whole human being is forfeited. That juries consist of 
groups, drawn more or less at random from the community, is essen­
tial to the sampling function. Imperfect sampling though it may be, it 
is less imperfect than having no sampling at all. 
In addition, juries offer several collateral benefits. One is that they 
reduce bias by dividing decisionmalcing functions between judge and 
jury. The judge is free to know everything, and cari. act to screen out 
biasing, speculative, or otherwise inadmissible evidence and argu­
ments about what the damages should be. The jury then is able to 
consider only proper evidence and arguments in reaching its decisions. 
Even when this is imperfect, it is a considerable pnprovement on re-
182 See supra Section IV.D. 
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quiring judges to know what a factfinder should not know, and then to 
try to decide in spite of that knowledge.183 
Another collateral benefit is the "lightning rod" function of juries. 
That is, by being the primary decisionmakers, juries become the tar­
gets of criticism, thereby drawing the fire away from judges. Moreo­
ver, juries can dissipate the attacks better than judges could. A jury 
that attracts the ire of the public fades back into the community and is 
replaced by another jury for the next trial. In contrast, as judges ren­
der one verdict after another, they risk accumulating criticism for suc­
cessive unpopular decisions. Further, the unpopular decisions of 
judges, unlike those of juries, might be viewed as the edicts of an 
unelected elite rather than as the sentiments of the general commu­
nity. The very criticism directed at some juries may illustrate their 
performance of a lightning rod function.184 To say the least, it is not 
obvious that the marginal benefit of increased predictability of judges' 
decisions (if such a benefit were to materialize) outweighs the various 
benefits provided by the use of juries - especially considering that 
most of the time juries reach decisions that judges regard as reason­
able.185 
2. Reforms Consistent with the Available Data 
Sensible and moderate reforms to reduce unpredictability, focusing 
on procedural adjustments, could improve on an essentially sound sys­
tem. 
One approach would be to increase the size of juries (from the six 
or eight civil jurors now found in many federal and state jurisdictions 
to the traditional twelve of the common law) in order to reduce un­
wanted variability and increase stability and predictability.186 
A second method, which emphasizes the diversity among injuries, 
would be to provide jurors with descriptions of a range of injuries as a 
basis for forming a reference scale with which to compare the case at 
bar.187 By seeing the injury under consideration in the context of other 
183. Of course, many judges believe that they can perform this cognitive feat, but what 
little hard data exist on the subject indicates that judges are no better than jurors at disre­
garding evidence they are not supposed to know. See Landsman & Rakos, supra note 18. 
184. Especially in cases where jurors have made unpopular decisions with which judges 
have not manifested disagreement. 
185. See Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence?, in 
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CrvrL JURY SYSTEM 248, 262-65 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). It 
is also worth noting that the law has mechanisms for reining in the rare runaway jury, 
namely additur/remittitur review and appeals. 
186. See Diamond et al., supra note 146; Saks, supra note 150; Saks & Marti, supra note 
150. 
187. See supra note 166 and accompanying text; see also Sunstein et al., supra note 51, at 
2104. 
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injuries, jurors would gain the advantage possessed by judges and law­
yers and insurance claims representatives - an appreciation of the di­
verse universe of injuries. 
Another powerful yet modest reform would be to pool jury awards 
made for similar injuries, and to present these cases and their award 
distributions to juries for guidance in reaching their general damages 
awards188 and to judges for conducting their additur/remittitur re­
views.189 New decisions would continuously be added to update the 
data pool.190 In either use, they could be offered as true "guidelines" 
- suggestions which could be departed from to the extent that the in­
stant case differed from those guideline cases.191 Pooling verdicts in 
similar cases, and funneling those back to juries (or judges), magnifies 
the benefit of sampling community judgments. Thus, rather than re­
ducing the role of the jury, we can reduce a possible disadvantage (un­
predictability) by making more use of one of its principal advantages 
(sampling). As the data of this study suggest, the problem with gen­
eral damages is not who makes the decision; rather, the problem is the 
inherent difficulty of the decision being made. 
E. Postscript 
The present study leaves open several important questions. Al­
though there is a strong underlying similarity of judgments among 
groups, especially concerning the nature of injuries, how might the 
models of award decisions be improved? Relatedly, what accounts for 
any differences that do exist among the models of the groups studied? 
Why, exactly, do defense lawyers' decision models depart from those 
of the other groups? Why, exactly, are jurors more variable than the 
others, even though their decision models are so similar?192 
The research described in this Article presented jurors, judges, and 
lawyers with bare-bones cases, consisting almost exclusively of facts 
about the injuries and their sequella. Understanding how decision-
188. See Saks et al., supra note 27 (reporting a jury simulation experiment showing that 
giving mock jurors guidance tended to reduce the variability of general damages awards for 
medium- and high-severity injuries). 
189. See Baldus et al., supra note 26. 
190. For details of a methodology for gathering and using such data in courts, see 
Baldus et al., supra note 26. See also Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb, supra note 26. 
191. Others have discussed these and additional techniques for dealing with this prob­
lem. See ABA REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMISSION TO IMPROVE THE TORT LIABILITY 
SYSTEM 10-15 (1987); ALI REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL 
INJURY, 199-230 (1991); Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb, supra note 26; Diamond et 
al., supra note 146; Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for 
Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 775 
(1995); Sunstein et al., supra note 51. 
192. The obvious hypothesis that the latter finding is due to a lack of experience with 
the task is only that, a hypothesis. 
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makers respond to the core attributes of injuries is only a first step. 
The models we have obtained can be built upon, layer by layer, sys­
tematically adding legally permissible contextual factors that should 
influence perceptions of the impact of injuries and the consequent 
damages. Then extra-legal contextual factors, including characteristics 
of cases, plaintiffs, and defendants, can be added. Although these 
ought not to affect damages awards, some of them are likely to, and 
identifying them can add to the predictive accuracy of the model. Fi­
nally, we can experiment with procedural and evidentiary variations 
that may affect the uses jurors (and judges and lawyers) make of the 
information they receive, and which may increase the predictability 
and decrease the variability of awards. Thus, the models developed in 
the present study, which already embody a considerable amount of 
predictive power, seem likely to be amenable to improvement through 
additional stages of model development. 
December 1999] (Jeneral !Jatnages 819 
APPENDIX A: 
EXAMPLES OF INJURY DESCRIPTIONS 
The two bones in the plaintiffs lower right leg-were badly broken 
in several places. The 33-year-old plaintiffs leg was so disrupted that 
repair of the blood vessels was impossible and surgical amputation of 
the leg just below the knee was necessary. Over parts of three years, 
the plaintiff was hospitalized on many occasions and underwent sev­
eral painful operations. The plaintiff was fitted with an artificial leg. 
Because the artificial leg causes the leg stump to become raw and in­
flamed, the plaintiff can walk for only brief periods. 
The 33-year-old plaintiff suffered numerous cuts on the left fore­
arm. The cuts required 40 stitches. The injury left several small scars 
that are permanent. 
The 37-year-old plaintiff suffered scarring of the lungs, which af­
fects their ability to absorb oxygen. Also, the lining of the lungs has 
hardened, making it difficult for them to move air in and out. These 
conditions make the plaintiff short of breath, more susceptible to flu 
and pneumonia, and more likely to develop lung cancer. The plaintiff 
cannot walk very far without getting winded and becoming exhausted. 
The plaintiff will continue to get worse and has a 50-50 chance of dy­
ing within five years. 
The 33-year-old plaintiff suffered burns that caused blistering and 
destroyed tissue on the face and over 80% of the body. The plaintiff's 
wounds and their treatment were extremely painful. During the first 
two months in the hospital, the plaintiff underwent massive infusions 
of blood plasma and a procedure of salves, bandaging, chlorine baths, 
and cutting away the dead tissue from the burned areas. Over several 
years, the plaintiff had extensive skin graft surgery and received fur­
ther treatment. The plaintiff suffered from painful tightening of the 
scar tissue, which impaired the mobility of joints and required constant 
surgical repairs. All of this required 70 operations, and at least ten 
more operations will be necessary over the next ten years. The plain­
tiff's skin resembles a patchwork quilt, and extremes of heat and cold 
will always be painful. 
The 33-year-old plaintiff suffered a broken right wrist. The plain­
tiff, who is right-handed, had to wear a cast for one month. For a few 
months, the plaintiff's wrist was somewhat weak and less flexible. 
Thereafter, the wrist healed completely. 
The 33-year-old plaintiff suffered a broken pelvis, such that the 
bone was splintered into fragments. In addition, the fragments on the 
left side were out of position and surgery was required to set them. 
The plaintiff spent one month in the hospital, followed by another 
month of bed rest at home. Over the next several months, the plaintiff 
gradually was able to walk and to resume normal activities. 
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APPENDIX B: 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR JURY-ELIGIBLE CmZENS193 
Introduction to the interview: 
We are studying people's decisions about how much monetary 
compensation an injured person should receive in a lawsuit. We want 
to talk to people like you who could end up serving as jurors and 
making these kinds of decisions. 
The interview will last about ten minutes. I will read you brief 
summaries of two real cases and then ask you for your reactions to 
them. The cases may contain some graphic details about the injuries. 
These cases involve an injured person, called the plaintiff, and the 
party responsible for the injury, called the defendant. According to 
the law, when the defendant is found to be responsible, plaintiffs are 
entitled to receive compensation for their medical expenses, lost 
wages, and the pain and suffering they have experienced. 
In each case that I'm going to read you, a jury in an earlier trial 
found the defendant to be legally responsible for the plaintiff's injury. 
Also at that trial, the jury compensated the plaintiff for medical ex­
penses and lost wages. So all you have to focus on here is how much 
pain and suffering this injury has caused the plaintiff and how much 
money would provide fair compensation for that pain and suffering. 
So for each case, I am going to ask you to come up with a dollar 
amount for the plaintiff's pain and suffering and to give me your im­
pressions of the injury. For example, to rate how much physical pain 
the injury has caused. If I ask any question that you do not wish to an­
swer, let me know and we'll move on to the next question. All your 
answers will be kept confidential and will be seen only by the re­
searchers directly involved with this project. 
The first case was then read, followed by these instructions and 
questions: 
To remind you, a jury in an earlier trial found the defendant in this 
case to be legally responsible for the plaintiff's injury or illness. Also 
in that trial, the jury compensated the plaintiff for medical expenses 
and lost wages. So leave those out of your calculation. 
193. The introduction to the interview for lawyers and judges varied somewhat from the 
introduction for jurors. The jurors' introduction had more information about the study 
(since they had not received a letter about the study in advance of the phone call) and more 
explanation of personal injury cases. The same instructions for determining an award were 
read to all respondent groups within each state. The questions about the awards and the 
injuries were asked of all participants in the same order. The particular socio-demographic 
items varied with the respondent group; the questions asked of each group are included 
here. 
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New York: 
You should focus only on compensating the plaintiff for the injury 
and for any conscious pain and suffering that the plaintiff experienced 
in the past, or will experience in the future with reasonable certainty. 
In deciding the amount to be awarded for the injury and for conscious 
pain and suffering, you may take into consideration any physical pain, 
mental suffering, disability, disfigurement, or loss of the ability to en­
joy life. There is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be 
awarded. Any award that you make should be fair and reasonable in 
light of the facts you have heard. Disregard any caps on pain and suf­
fering in your state and give the award you think the injury should re­
ceive without regard to any cap. 
Illinois: 
You should focus only on compensating the plaintiff for any physi­
cal pain, mental suffering, disability, or disfigurement that the plaintiff 
experienced in the past, or will experience in the future with reason­
able certainty, as a result of the injury. In deciding the amount to be 
awarded, you may consider the nature, extent, and duration of the in­
jury. There is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be 
awarded. Any award that you make should be fair and reasonable in 
light of the facts you have heard. Disregard any caps on pain and suf­
fering in your state and give the award you think the injury should re­
ceive without regard to any cap.194 
With all this in mind, how much money would you award to the 
plaintiff? 
[If the respondent answered zero] 
Why do you think the plaintiff should receive no compensation? 
Ifthe respondent said, in effect, the defendant was "not guilty" or 
"not liable, " the interviewer replied: Let me remind you that a 
jury in an earlier trial found the defendant in this case to be le­
gally responsible for the plaintiff's injury or illness. 
With this in mind, how much money would you award to the 
plaintiff? 
How much money do you think the average juror would award this 
plaintiff? 
Now I'm going to ask you five questions about your impressions of 
the injuries the plaintiff suffered. For each question, I'd like you to 
indicate your judgment on a five-point scale. 
194. The last sentence in the instructions in both states was included for only the judges 
and lawyers, who would tend to be aware of existing caps while the jurors would not. 
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1. Considering both the amount of physical pain and how long it will 
last, how much physical pain will this injury have caused the plain­
tiff? From one, no pain at all, to five extreme pain? 
2. Considering both the amount of mental suffering (that is, worry, 
fear, depression, and so forth) and how long it will last, how much 
mental suffering will this injury have caused the plaintiff? From 
one, no mental suffering at all, to five, extreme mental suffering? 
3. Considering both the amount of disability and how long it will last, 
how much disability will this injury have caused the plaintiff? 
From one, no disability at all, to five, extreme disability? 
4. Considering both the amount of disfigurement and how long it will 
last, how much disfigurement will this injury have caused the 
plaintiff? From one, no disfigurement at all, to five, extreme dis­
figurement? 
5. Overall, considering all aspects, how severe is the injury to the 
plaintiff? From one, not at all severe, to five, extremely severe? 
The second case was then read, followed again by the award in­
structions. The same award and injury questions as above were asked 
for the second case. 
After the awards and injury ratings were made for the second case, 
the following socio-demographic information was obtained. 
JURORS 
In order to be sure that we have a fair representation of all kinds of 
people, we'd like to ask you the following questions. 
Do you personally know anyone who has had either of the condi­
tions I have read to you about? IF YES: which one? 
How would you describe where you live? Would you say it is: a 
large city; the suburbs of a large city; a medium-sized city; or a small 
town or rural area? 
What is your age? 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
0 - 8th grade 
9 - llth grade 
high school graduate 
some college 
college graduate 
post-college study or degree 
December 1999] General Damages 823 
Please tell me which of the following ranges best describes your to-
tal annual household income. 
less than $15,000 
$15,000 - $30,000 
$31,000 - $50,000 
$51,000 - $75,000 
over $75,000 
Thank you for your participation in this interview. The answers 
you have provided will assist the researchers in their study of legal de­
cision making. Thank you very much for your time. 
The following information also was recorded but was not asked of 
the participants: 
gender: male, female 
state: Illinois, New York 
from urban or rural county group: urban, rural 
JUDGES 
About what percentage of the cases that come before you are per­
sonal injury cases? 
Do the people who serve as jurors in your court come mostly: 
from a large city; from the suburbs of a large city; from a medium­
sized city; or from a small town or rural area? 
Do you personally know anyone who has had either of the condi­
tions I have read to you about, or have you heard a case involving ei­
ther of these conditions? IF YES: which one? 
For approximately how many years have you been hearing per­
sonal injury cases as a judge? 
That concludes the interview. Would you like to receive a sum­
mary of the results of the study when it is completed? 
Thank you for your participation in this interview. The answers 
you have provided will assist the researchers in their study of damages 
decision-making. Thank you very much for your time. 
The following information also was recorded but was not asked of 
the participants: 
gender: male, female 
state: Illinois, New York 
from urban or rural county group: urban, rural 
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LAWYERS 
What percentage of your work involves representing clients in per­
sonal injury cases? 
In personal injury cases, do you represent: mostly plaintiffs, 
mostly defendants, or both about equally? 
In the personal injury cases that you have worked on, do the plain­
tiffs come mostly: from a large city; from the suburbs of a large city; 
from a medium-sized city; or from a small town or rural area? 
Do you personally know anyone who has had either of the condi­
tions I have read to you about, or have you been involved in a case in 
which the plaintiff had either of these conditions? IF YES: which 
one? 
Have you served as an arbitrator in a personal injury case? 
IF YES: Have you done that: rarely, occasionally, or often? 
For approximately how many years have you been handling per­
sonal injury cases? 
That concludes the interview. Would you like to receive a sum­
mary of the results of the study when it is completed? 
Thank you for your participation in this interview. The answers 
you have provided will assist the researchers in their study of damages 
decision-making. Thank you very much for your time. 
The following information also was recorded but was not asked of 
the participants: 
gender: male, female 
state: Illinois, New York 
from urban or rural county group: urban, rural 
from plaintiff or defense group: plaintiff, defense 
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APPENDIX C: 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS CONCEPTS 
Percentage of variance. The percentage of variance accounted for 
tells us how well a group of variables included in a predictive model 
accounts for what one seeks to predict, such as awards. Zero percent 
of the variance in awards accounted for by injury ratings and demo­
graphics would reflect a complete absence of predictive power; 100% 
of the variance accounted for would reflect perfect predictive power. 
Statistical significance of the predictor variables in the model. Only 
those variables that have a statistically significant relationship to the 
variable being predicted make a contribution to the predictive model. 
Thus, variables that are not statistically significant are omitted from 
the model. 
Interactions. Sometimes the relationship of a predictor variable to 
the variable being predicted is affected by another predictor variable. 
In such circumstances one can add to the predictive power of a model 
by including these statistically significant "interactions" between pre­
dictor variables in the model. For example, we found that disability 
interacted with state, such that disability had a greater impact on 
awards for New York judges than for Illinois judges. 
Direction of effect. The main effects (variables acting individually) 
and interaction effects (variables acting jointly) can predict either in­
creases or decreases in the variable being predicted. 
Magnitude of effect. Some predictors are more powerful than oth­
ers. The magnitude of an effect is typically reflected in a "regression 
coefficient" (such as a Beta weight), and these are presented in a table 
of the regression results. One of the most intuitively meaningful ways 
to understand the magnitude of effect of a predictor is simply to com­
pare it to other predictors. 
Shared variance and unique variance. Sometimes different predic­
tors are correlated with each other (that is, they "share variance"), so 
that there is redundancy in their predictive power. The amount of 
variance attributable to a given predictor and that predictor alone 
("unique variance") is determined statistically by regression analysis 
by removing the redundancy. In order to compare the extent to which 
a given predictor's predictive power is a result of its shared versus 
unique influence, we compare the magnitude of its uncontrolled effect 
on the variable being predicted (given by a simple zero-order correla­
tion, bivariate r, in which no other variables are controlled) with the 
magnitude of its effect on the variable being predicted in the regres­
sion model (given by Beta, in which the effect of other variables has 
been removed). 
The reader who wishes to understand these statistical techniques 
even more deeply might consult one of the many textbooks on the 
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topic, or, for a treatment designed for judges and lawyers, read Daniel 
L. Rubinfeld, Guide to Multiple Regression, § 4, in MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT 
TESTIMONY (David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks & 
Joseph Sanders eds., 1997). 
